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 ABSTRACT 
SCHELLING, ELLSBERG AND THE lHEORY OF CONFUCT 
It is widely known that the book, The  Strategy ofConflict, has influenced many scholars and 
decision makers since its publication in 1960.  The purpose ofthis project is to examine what 
Thomas  C  Schelling  calls  the  'The theory  of interdependent  decision";  the  motivation 
behind its creation and the examination of its lasting impact 
lt appears that what motivated  Thomas C.  Schelling to write  his  now  famous  book, The 
Strategy ofConflict, stems from  his dissatisfaction with the theory of games framework for 
the  resolution  of what  Schelling  caUs  "mutual  dependence  games"  otherwise  known  as 
nonzero-sum games.  Daniel Ellsberg was also dissatisfied with game theory at that time and 
was  interested,  as  was  Schelling,  in  the  possible  miiitary  applications  of what  could  be 
characterized as the Theory of Conflict  Though, contraf)' to Schelling who was interested in 
developing the whole field of interdependent decision theory, Ellsberg was more interested 
in the possible applications of  coercion and blackmail. 
According  to  Schelling,  this  new  theory  could  allow  for  the  analysis  and  prediction  of 
behaviors that wil!  make possible what Schelling himself describes as the "correct use of 
strategy in a conflict".  The potential applications of this theory are very broad: they  range 
from tl],e  way of  waging war to the art of raising children 
Key words: Thomas C. Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, Theory of Confliet, Theory of Games RÉSUMÉ 
SCHELLING, ELLSBERG ET LA THÉORIE DES CONFLITS 
Il  est connu dans le  domaine de  la  théorie des jeux que le  livre The  Strategy ofConflict a 
influencé un grand nombre de chercheurs et d'hommes de décisions depuis sa publication en 
1960. 
Le  but de  ce  projet  de  recherche  est d'examiner ce que  Thomas  C.  Schelling appelle  la 
théorie  des  décisions  interdépendantes (mu tuaI  dependance  games)  mieux connue sous  le 
nom  de jeux à somme  non-nulle; ce qui a  poussé à  la  création d'un nouveau concept de 
solution ainsi  qu'un grand bagage de concepts qui pennet de dire qu'une nouvelle théorie 
prenant le  nom  de  théorie des  conflits a  été créée.  Nous examinerons aussi  les  impacts 
(qu'on ressent encore aujourd'hui) de celle-ci. 
Il  appert que ce qui  a  motivé Tom Schelling à écrire le  livre en question The  Strategy of 
Conflict prend naissance dans son insatisfaction par rapport au cadre d'analyse qu'offrait la 
théorie des jeux à la fin  des années 50 et au début des années 60, pour la résolution de jeux 
d'interdépendances (mu tuaI dependance games).  Daniel  Ellsberg, était lui  aussi insatisfait 
avec la théorie des jeux à cette période  Eilsberg et  Schelling étaient aussi intéressés aux 
applications militaires  Ce projet de recherche soutient; également que c'est, d'une certaine 
façon,  l'interaetion  entre  les  deux  hommes qui  a  rendu  possible la création  de  ce  qu'on 
connaît sous le nom de la théorie des conflits. 
Selon  Schelling,  cette  nouvelle  théorie  pourrait  pennettre  l'analyse  et  la  prédiction  de 
comportements  durant  une  situation  de  conflit  et  permettrait  de  sortir  gagnant  de  cette 
situation.  Les  applications  potentielles  de  cette théorie sont très  grandes,  elles  vont  des 
comportements à adopter durant un conflit armé à l'art d'élever les enfants 
Mots clés: Thomas C. Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, Théorie des Conflits, Théorie des 
Jeux "War is a matter ofvital importance ro  the State;  the province oflife or dearh;  rhe  road ro 
survival or ruin.  It is mandatory rhat it be thoroughly studied"i 
"How much tragedy can we live with and still not have 'the survivors envy rhe dead'.'? ,,) 
''But there remains another problem,  the most serious for rhe  West.  The  problem ofsheer 
survival - not rhat  we  will be nibbled ro  death  or subverted inro  ineffectualiry,  but {har  we 
will be  annihilated in  a  blow  or Iwo,  or blackmailed into  accepting a series of  Munichs 
because  roo  many may now  consider the  thought of  going  to  war  ro  defend justice, () 
bizarre orfanciful"3 
''The  most specracular event of  {he  past half century is  one {hat  did not occur.  We  have 
enjoyed fifty-eight years  without any use  of nuclear  weapons."  That  sfreak  would have 
seemed unimaginably lucky to  people in  1945 or 1950.  In  1960,  CP.  Snow  declared it a 
"mathematical certainty" that  thermonuclear war would erupr  within a decade unless  the 
superpowers disarmed completely and immediately. ,,4 
1 Tzu (1963), p,  63 
2 Kalm (1960),  pAO 
3 Ibid, p.523 
4  Schelling (2005), p. INTRODUCTION 
Starting with the First World War and culminating with the Vietnam War, economic analysis 
allowed for the creation of decision rules  applicable to  military problems, the purpose of 
\",hich  was the optimal use of avaiJable resources.  It  was  with the Second World War that 
economics  as  a  science  began  to  have  a  particuJarly  meaningful  impact  on  military  and 
civilian decision makers. 
The  concept  of maximlzation  began  to  have  a  significant  influence  on  military  strategy 
during the  Second World War.  Maximization was  used to select targets  for  the  strategie 
bombing campaign that was  Ied  by the Allies on Hitler's Germany.  The Allied strategists 
were iooking  for  nerve  points  in  the  German  war  machine.  Then,  during  the Cold  War, 
contrary to what happened during World War II, strategists looked for ways to minimize the 
probability ofa nuclear conflict. 
In effect, during the CoId War, the emergence of the threat of nuclear war between East and 
West caused strategie considerations to take on an entirely different meaning.  The beginning 
of the  Cold  War  resulted  in  the  expanded  influence  of economists  in  military  circles 
essentially because of the advent of applied military economics and decision making tools 
developed as a  result of it.  This ascension started with the development of military cost­
benefit analysis that aimed at minimizing costs in tems of human  life,  risk,  capital and at 
maximizing eoemy destruction.  The influence of economists in military matters culminated 
with the  transformation of military planning  by  Robert  McNamara and  the  "Whiz Kids". 
These polie)' makers pcrsonified a new breed of technocrats who were trained as economists 
but were totally devoted to military thinking.  Their influence in the Pentagon allowed them 
to play a central role in the plamting of  the Vietnam Wars. 
Another  factor  that  influenced  the  rise  of strategie  thinking  during  that  period  was  the 
invention of the  atomic  bomb and  later of the  hydrogen  bomb.  Strategie thinking  in  the 
5 see Kaplan (1983), Ellsberg (2002) or Amadae (2003) 2 
1960's consisted initiaily in the development of a systematic framework for armed conflicts 
and ultimately in the elaboration of foreign policy.  The theory ofgames played an important 
part in strategie thinking particularly because of the work done on this subject by Thomas C. 
Schelling and Daniel Ellsberg. 
This paper will deal mairuy with the work of Schelling and EIIsberg.  The work ofthese t"vo 
economists, in particular, ,viII be discussed because there are many similarities between both 
men.  One of  the most important was their dissatisfaetion with game theory at the time.  Both 
men  were  dissatisfied  with  the  solution  concept  proposed  by  von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern, and with  the one proposed by Nash  Also,  it  will  present short biographical 
notes on bath Schelling and Ellsberg.  And last!y,  it  will deal with Ellsberg and Schellmg's 
work and later application of  the theory. 
Though  they  never  really  worked  together,  there is  evidence  that  Schelling and  Ellsberg 
corresponded and communicated with one another during the  late  50's and early  60's.  ln 
fact,  Schelling servcd as one  of Ellsberg's advisors on  his  doctoral thesis, Risk.  Ambiguity 
and Decision.  Ellsberg  was  dissatisfied  with  bath  the  solution  concepts  and  with  the 
question  of  rationality  (meaning  the  way  it  was  presented  by  von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern).  This critique was exposed for the first time in  1961  in "Risk, Ambiguity, and 
the  Savage  Axioms"  and  secondly  in  his  1962  doctoral  thesis  "Risk,  Ambiguity  and 
Decision",  though  he  did  lay  the  basis  for  it  in  1956  in  'The Theory  of the  Reluctant 
Duelist".  Ellsberg did not work on decision theory for very long, although that period of his 
Iife was very intense (one could argue that his whole life has been intense l) and we have yet 
to comprehend ail the ramifications of his work.  Ellsberg's critique aimed at the very heart 
of  game  theory,  which  is  rationality  and  its  solution  concept,  whereas  Sehelling's 
dissatisfaction was not with the rationaEty concept and his  aim was more humble.  lt was to 
develop what he considered a satisfying analytical framework in conflict.  Schelling created 
what is now known as the TI1eory of Confliet, the basis of which was laid in The Strategy of 
Conflict published in 1960. 3 
Ellsberg's  interest,  contra!)'  to  Schelling's,  was  not  the  development  of a  whole  new 
analytical  framework;  his  work  was  very  important  to  particular  aspects  of  the 
Theo!)' of Conflict.  Schelling, on the other hand, worked on the whole field of strategy and 
aimed to make the Theo!)' of Conflict a totally comprehensive interdlsciplina!)' field, able to 
dictate an  adequate reaction to  every situation.  However, the similarities between the two 
economists do  not stop with the dissatisfaction they shared with the theory of games.  They 
both studied at Harvard.  Ellsberg and Schelling both worked at RAND during the late 50's 
and early 60's and finally, they both publicly criticized the way the government was dealing 
with the Vietnam War in  the early  1970's.  Ellsberg was  more flamboyant in  his  criticism 
than  Schelling.  This  is  a  good  reflecticn  of their  personalities;  Ellsberg  never  did  rnind 
changing the system, whereas Schelling wanted to make things work within the framework 
of  the existing system. 
Thus,  Ellsberg,  because  of his  dissatisfaction  with  the  Vietnam  War policy,  decided  to 
release what v.ïe now known as the Pentagon Papers to the  press.  Schelling, on  the other 
hand,  decided  along  with  other  Harvard  professors  who  had  aIl  served  as  presidential 
advisors at one time or another to meet Kissinger personally to tell him they did not want to 
be part of the  Vietnam \Var policy anymore.  Even though Schelling, after his  break  \\~th 
policy,  could  no  longer have  access  to  the  high  level  govemment information,  as  he  did 
before the break, he  continued  his  work in  economics; he  simply changed the focus  of his 
research,  whereas  Ellsberg  does  not  come  through  entirely  as  such.  He  completely 
abandoned  economics  after  releasing the  Pentagon  Papers  to  entirely devote  himself to 
being an anti-war activist. 
It is true that both Schelling and Ellsberg were dissatisfied with the game theory framework 
and that this dissatisfaction motivated them to fwther their research in  that field.  But were 
tl1at their only motivation, noV\'  could one "ccount for their interest in  the milita'"::v strategy') 
The  answer to  that  question  must  reside  in  the atmosphere  that  the  RAND  Corporation 
helped create.  There will be a later discussion ofthat atmosphere 4 
But firstly, who are Thomas Schelling and Daniel Elisberg?  Many know Ellsberg as an anti­
war activist, but few  people know he had an economic background or that he had worked on 
decision theory.  Schelling, on the other hand, is known for his work on micro-motives, focal 
points  and  urban  development.  But  what  initiated  ail  this?  The  following  should  help 
answer these questions. 
A reader might also want to have a look at the concept plan on Appendix C to have a general 
comprehension  of the  paper.  At  the  same  time  the  reader  will  be  able  to  see  the 
ramifications of  conflict theory and the influences exerted on its creators. CHAPTER 1 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING 
Schelling  was  born  in  1921  in  Oakland,  Califomia.  He 
received  a  bachelor's  degree  in  economics  in  1943  from 
Berkeley  University,  he  then  went on  to  further studies  at 
Harvard where he  recelved his doctorate in  1951.  ln  1948, 
Schelling  worked  with  US. ambassador Averell  Harriman 
on the negotiation of the Marshall Plan  This experience in 
negotiation had  a  lasting  influence on  him.  Eventually,  he 
started teaching at Yale (1953), then moving to Harvard. He 
also spent a period oftime at RAND in  1958 where Ellsberg 
also worked during the same period.  Scheiling has now retired from teaching, but still gives 
the occasionai  lecture.  Oetober  10th  2005,  was the consecration of a  lifelong dedication to 
his field of study.  The Bank of Sweden Prize in  Economie Sciences in  MemoI)' of Alfred 
Nobel  of 2005  was  awarded  to  him  and  Robert  Aumann  for  their  contributions  to  the 
enhancement  of the  understanding  of eon.f1ict  and  cooperation  behavior  through  game 
theory. 
Schelling's  first  publications  were  conventional  as they  were  published  in  Econometrica 
(1946), the Ameriean Economie Review  (1947 &  1949)  and the Review of  Economies and 
Statisties.  His first book, National Income Behavior, which he published at age 25, was also 
very conventional.  lt artalyzed  the  gross  domestic product calculus,  problems  relating to 
economic  policy  and  fiscal  policy.  It  was  with  his  second  publication,  International 
Economies (1958), that Schelling started to gain widespread attention.  In  fact, after reading 
International Economies Robert Solow wrate;  « (... ) international Economies  pieks  up  on 
sueh topies as foreign aid negotiations and eost-sharing arrangements (..  ) and it talks about 6 
them in  characteristic ways that an ordinary economist would never have thought of.  »6  ln 
fact,  the  last two chapters of this  book are quite interesting sinee they announce things to 
come.  The chapters are entitled: 
Economie warfare and strategie trade contrais 
Trade contrais and national seeurity 
ln  these  chapters,  Schelling  illustrates  the  strategic  implications  of economic  exchanges 
between allies  and between enemies.  His intention is  not to  criticize the structure that was 
already in place at that time: that is the "Mutuai Defense Assistance Control Act"  The la\\! 
renders American economic and military support to countnes conditional on participating in 
the embargo on exporting strategie goods to the Soviet Union.  ln order to better understand 
the implications of this  law,  we must first  look at the definition of a  strategic good.  11  is 
defined as follows:  "items (. .. ) used in the production of arms (..  ),,7  The executive branch 
of the American govemment also used the following criteria to ascertain the importance of 
certain strategie goods: 
1)  How an item can be used in war;
 
2)  How it can be converted to war use;
 
3)  Ho\\! it contributes to military production
 
4)  Whether its control would cause a critical deficiency in the Soviet war economy;
 
and
 
5)  Whether the item embodies infonnation useful to the Soviets in war production
8
 
Subjectivity in the criteria is mentioned by Schelling, but he does not really foeus on il. 
ScheHing  prefers  to  apply  himself to sbowing the  perverse effeets  of the  embargo.  For 
example, when a government restricts the sale of strategie goods such as planes ot parts that 
are used in  the:  assembly of planes to an enemy state and allows for the sale of something 
that sounds as inoffensive as bicycles for example, it  still  indirectly assists the enemy with 
the  production of strategie goods.  This  is  so  because,  the  enemy  state  can  now free  the 
production capacity that would have been taken by the production of bicycles and specialize 
6 Zeckhauser (1989) 
7 Schelling (1958), p.  498 
8  Ibid, p. 498 7 
in  the production of planes.  ft  IS  rather simple economic analysis, but if we  believe Robert 
Solow, nobody had thought of it before.  Schelling's work is  not driven by highly technical 
tools, but, according to Solow, it focuses on a subject, it looks at it, like no one else would. 
In  1960, with the publication of The Strategy ofConflict, Schelling caused quite a stir in  the 
strategie  thought  community.  Almost  the  entire  book  had  been  published  in  various 
scientific articles between  1956 and  1959.  His admitted aim was to create a new academic 
discipline that  would be known as  the theory of conflict.  This  new  discipline studies the 
actions that an agent must take ta be able to win a contest or get the better of an opponent in 
a particular situation.  Here again, Schelling relies on simple game theory tools.  In order to 
give  more  weight  to  the  ideas  he  puts  forth  in  the  book,  Schelling  used  experimental 
economics,  which  was  quite  original  at  the  time  but  was  used  at  RAND.  There  will, 
naturally be further discussion of these tools and what impacts The Strategy ofConflict had 
on game theory and U.S. foreign polie)'. 
LI  Thomas Schelling and the origins of conflict theory 
The ideas Thomas Schelling brought to light with the publication of The Strategy ofCo/?flict 
made quite an  impression on the game theory circle.  What'he proposed would profoundly 
change strategie thinking.  As  a  matter of fact,  he  considered war, as did  Machiavelli and 
von Clausewitz, as  a fonu of negotiation, a violent fonu of it,  but negotiation nonetheless. 
Schelling came to the conclusion that the existence ofconflicts is  inevitable.  It is because of 
this  inevitability  that  one  has  to  study  the  behavior that  is  associated  with  any  form  of 
conflict.  By studying the behavior associated with conflict and also the behavior that should 
be adopted in confliet, Schelling sought to find a way of minimizing the cost and duration of 
a conflict.  To do so, he emphasized the limited use of violence in arder to communicate ta 
the other party that one has a reserve force that would allow one, if necessary, ta cause much 
more damage than was first threatened. 8 
One of the  bases  of the Theory of Conflict or the  theory  of interdependent decisions  (as 
Schelling  first  wanted  to  cali  the  new  theory)  is  Schelling's  analysis  of negotiation  and 
coordination problems.  As already stated, Schelling was not satisfied with Nash's 1950 and 
1953 bargaining solution concept.  One of the motivations behind conflict theory is that its 
author wanted to create a solution concept that would better reflect reality; this being what 
Schelling finds the most problematic with Nash's solution concept. 
ln order to better understand Schelling's dissatisfaction, the following is a short discussion of 
the theory of  games as seen by Nash. 
1.2  Theory of Games according to Nash 
/.2.1  John Nash 
John Nash was born on June  13
th 
,  1928  in  Bluefield, West Virginia.  He \Vas  the son of an 
electrical  engineer  and  of a  teacher  By  the  time  he  attended  high  school,  Nash  was 
conducting scientific experiments in  his room and he had also read Men ofMathematics by 
E. T.  Bell.  AIso by that time, Nash had proved the classic Fermat theorem. 
Nash  entered  the  Carnegie  Institute  of  Technology  (which  is  now  Carnegie  Mellon 
University) in  1945  on a Westinghouse Scholarship as a chemical engineering student.  He 
disliked the courses and the fact that, it was not "( ... ) a matter of how "vell one could think 
and understand or leam facts but how weil one could handle a pipette and perform a titration 
in  the  laboratory.,,9  Encouraged by the  mathematics department, he  decided to become a 
mathematics student.  Upon graduation, his  mathematical skill and knowledge allowed him 
to get an M.S in addition to his B.S. 
ln  1948,  Nash  decided  to attend  Princeton  as  a  postgraduate  student  and "(,.) quickly 
completed a Ph.D under the supervision of Albert Tucker."IO In fact, Nash had completed his 
Ph.D thesis  on "Non-cooperative games" by the spring of 1950.  The thesis contained the 
9 Nash (1994) 
10 Leonard (1994) 9 
definition of what would be later known as the Nash Equilibrium.  The thesis is, for the large 
part, reproduced  in  a  1951  Annals ofMathematics article with the  same title as  the thesis. 
Instead  of developing  a  theory  of n-person  cooperative  games  as  von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern did, Nash develops a theory based on the absence ofcooperation.  In his work, 
"( ... )  each  player  is  assumed  to  behave  independently,  without  any  collaboration  or 
communication  with  the  other players."11  The  essence  of Nash's theory  is  the  notion  of 
equilibrium  12 which he defines as, 
"[... ] an  n-tuple s =  (SI,  ... ,  Sn)  is  an equilibrium point if,  for every i, we  have:  Pi 
(s) = maxri  Pi  (Si,  r,),  where Pi 0 is  player i's payoffand Pi  (s,r,) =  Pi  (SI,  ... , Si.l, rh 
S;+I,  ... ,  Sn)'  In words: An equilibrium point is an n-tupie s such that each piayer's 
mixed strategy maximizes  his  payoff if the strategies of the  others are he Id  fixed. 
Thus each player"s strategy is optimal against those of  the others'>!3 
Nash then defines the concept of  a solution.  Agame is considered as being solvable if its set 
S  of equilibrium  points  satisfy  what  Nash  cal!s  an  interchangeability  condition.  This 
condition states that (t,  ri)  €  Sand s  E: S implies that (s,  fi) €  S for  aIl  i.  In vvords,  "[ ... ] a 
game  is  solvable  if its  set of equilibrium points are  interchangeable,  i.e.  if any  player can 
choose  freely  a strategy  from  any  of her  cquilibrium  strategies  and  the  result  remain  an 
equilibrium points. ,,14  Nash  then  goes  on  to examine the  notion  of strong  soivability, the 
notion implies that "[ ... ] agame is strongly solvable if it has a solution S such that, for al! i, s 
€  S and  p (s,  ri) = Pi  (s)  imply  (s,  ri)  €  S,  that is,  if every  unilateral  deviation  from  an 
equi1ibrium n-tuple causing no change in the payoff still determines an equilibrium n-tuple." 
Thus,  Nash defines a solution to  non cooperative game such as,  "[. .. ] a set of equilibrium 
points such that the equilibrium strategies ofthe players were (are) interchangeable. ,,15 
Schelling's dissatisfaction, however,  did  not lie with the Nash equilibrium but with Nash's 
contribution  to  bargaining  which  was  also  very  original  and  important  ("The  Bargaining 
Il Giocoli (2004) 
12 Nash had already presented this notion in his  l-page paper published in the Proceeding of the 
National Academy of Science, "Equilibrium in n-Person Games" in 1950.  This presentation is 
slightly different from the one in his thesis.  In the  1950 paper, Nash uses a Brouwer criterion to proye 
the existence on an equitibritun point and in his thesis he uses a Kakutani criterion. 
13  Giocoli (2004)
 
14 Leonard (J 994)
 
15 Giocoli (2004), (parenthesis mine)
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Problem", April  1950 and "Two-Person Cooperative Games", January  1953).  Before Nash, 
economists thought that the result of two parties bargaining was dependent on an  imprecise 
notion  called  "bargaining  powers"16  Nash  did  not  build  his  solution  upon  what  he  saw 
bargainers doing.  Instead,  Nash seems to  ask himself:  "What would  a good solution  look 
Iike?  This is  reportedly how he found  many of his answers and why they were sa original 
17 
One could aIso contend that a reason why Nash's work on bargaining was so irmovative was 
because  he  had  started  working  on  bargaining  before  he  had  training  in  the  field  of 
economics (Leonard, 1994).  In effect, "The Bargaining Problem" was written for an elective 
class in  international economics wllich he took while still at Carnegie.  This seems to have 
been Nash's only formaI  training  in  economic theory.  'The Bargaining Problem" presents 
an axiomatic treatment of the two  persan bargaining problem and shows how, glven certain 
"reasonable"  requirements,  "(...) the  only  feasible  solution  is  that  which  ma.;'{imizes  the 
product of the player's utilities,,\8  The axioms or assumptions Nash exposed were a short 
Iist of "reasonable" or sensible-sounding conditions that a good solution should respect.  The 
axioms or assumptions are the following 19: 
Given F that denotes an arbitration scheme which maps a typical bargaining problem [R (u·, 
/)] into  a arbitrated  outcome, Nash  contended that  a solution  must  respect the  following 
assumptions: 
1)  Invariance with  respect to utility transformations.  Let (RI,  (u)',  v)')]  and  [R2, 
(U2·,  V2·)]  be two versions of the same bargaining game,  i.e., they  differ only in 
the units and origins of  the utility functions.  Then the arbitrated values functions 
F[RI,  (UI',  VI")]  and  F[R2,  (U2·'  v2')]  shall  be  related  by  the  same  utility 
transfonnation. 
In  other  words,  a solution ta a bargaining situation  does  not  depend  on  the  way  a player 
measures his satisfaction. 
16 This notion is attributed to von Neumann and Morgenstem and will be treated later on.
 
17 Leonard (1994) reports that Shubik, who was roommate of Nash, says tllat Nash was known for
 
reading "hardl)' anything".  And this was "(...) probably one reason for his success because some of
 
the problems he solved were one which the experts had given up on as hopeless".  One can also refer
 
ta Sylvia Nasar'sbiography of Nash for a general impression of tl1e man.
 
18 Leonard (1994)
 
J 9 The assumptions are taken from Luce and Raiifa (1957).
 Il 
2)	  Pareto optimaIity.  A  solution to a  bargaining situation (uo,  va)  shaH  have the 
follo\\~ng properties: 
1.  ua::: u' and Va ::: v· 
Il.  (uo,  va)  is a point of RI 
111.	  There is  no (u,v)  in R,  different fonn (ua,va), such that u :::  Ua and 
v::: Vo 
The agreement that the two players reach has i) to be at least as good as the utility value of 
the status quo, ii) to be within the realm of possibilities and iii) to maximize the utility levels 
of the players in  such a  way that there can not be another possible point that can better the 
utility value the agreement gives the players. 
3)	  lndependence of irrelevant alternatives.  Thus suppose [R),  (u)+,  v,')] and [R2, 
(u/, V2')]  are two games and that: 
1.  R)  is a subset of  R2 
Il.  F[R2, (U2', \12+)]  is in RI 
Then, F[R), (u·, v*)J  = FlR2, (u·, v·')] 
[R, (u', v·)] being the solution of a bargaining problem. 
Thus, if new trade possibilities are added in a  way that L~e  status quo does  not change, the 
solution remains the same.  It cannot be influenced by the new trade possibilities. 
4)	  Symmetry.  Suppose  the  version  [R,  (u+,  v')]  of a  bargaining game  has  the 
following properties: 
+ 
1.  U  = V 
Il.  If(u,v) is  in R; the (v,u) is  in R 
111.  (Ua,va) = F[R, (u', v+)] 
"In words,  if an  abstract version  of a  bargairting game places  the players  in  completely 
symmetric raIes, the arbitrated value (solution) shall yield them equal utility payoffs, (. ..)"20 
According to the f0U11h  assumption, if two players have similar negotiation positions, they 
will receive symmetric payoffs
21 
. 
20 Luce and Railla, p.l27 (parenthesis mine)
 
21  On  the  other  hand,  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstem's  stable-points  (the  resuJt  of bilaterai
 
bargaining)  are  dependent on custom aIld  thus,  quite  vague,  (the use of the fictitious  player in n­

persan games, also did not contribute ta a precise outcome ta bilateral bargaifÙng).  The von Neumann
 12 
The Nash bargaining solution satisfies these four asswnptions and as  Luce and Raffia say, 
"(... ) it is the only function which does SO,,22 
Schelling's  dissatisfaction  with  Nash's  bargaining  solution  lies  in  the  fourth  aXlom.  In 
effect,  Nash explicitly postulates symmetry, and as John Harsanyi  writes when discussing 
Nash's  solution;  "Intuitively  the  assumption  underlying  this  axiom  is  that  a  rational 
bargainer will  not expect a rational opponent to grant him larger concessions than he  would 
make himself under similar conditions,,23 Reacting to this,  Schelling adds, "It is  the moves 
that are interesting,  not the game without moves; and  it  is  the  potential  asymmetry of the 
moves that makes them most interesting,,24  Thus, what Schelling's critique implies is,  'Why 
should players even play since the expected outcome is a draw?'  In  such a situation, players 
are not even required to play, since the solution is self-evident.  The solution would be a tie. 
AIso,  and  this  explains  why  tacit  communication  is  central  to  the  theory  of conflict, 
Schelling believes that any bargaining game gives way to a  tacit  bargaining process.  The 
reason for this is that since both players come to expect a draw. the only way to deviate From 
tlUs  situation is  to  try  to  influence the solution by  commitments,  for  example.  In  Nash's 
negotiation process, players are required to  make offers.  In  Schelling's version, a nuance is 
added  specifically  stating  that  "( ..  )  a  player  can  make  a  'final'  offer,  a  'commitment'; 
whoever can record  an  offer  favorable  to  himself and  known to the  other,  and  Jeave  the 
room, has the wirming tactiC.,,25  For Schelling, in order to come out on the winning side in a 
conflict, one has to make "(  ... ) the other player choose in his favor,,26  In  fact, this notion is 
central to conflict theory.  One must always try to get the opponent to choose in one's favor. 
and Morgenstern solution offered the whole set of Pareto efficient allocations.  For Nash,  Ù1e outcome 
resulting  from  a negotiation  process  is  obtained  by  the  individual  bargainers  acting  in  Ù1eir  own 
interest.  This strategy combination is an eqlÙlibrium strategy combination if every player's response 
is the best response to  the strategies of ail  the other players.  Consequently, there is  nothing a player 
can do independently that wiU increase his payoff. 
22  Luce and Raiffa (1957), p.l27 
23 Harsanyi, (1957) in Schelling (1960a), p.  279 
2~  Schelling (1960a), p  277-8 
25  Ibid, p. 276 
26 Ibid, p.  276 13 
Schelling adds  that even  when  commitments are  made,  there  is  still  room  for  symmetry. 
However,  this  symmetry  is  of a  different kind;  it  is  not achieved through bargaining but 
rather  by  each  party  iteratively  suggesting  a  solution  until  a  final  solution,  deemed 
acceptable by  both parties, is  found.  To facilitate this process, the party which may place a 
"final offer" is  determined  arbitrarily  (e.g.  coin toss)  at the  beginning of the  negotiation. 
Thus, in this kind of symmetry, each party has an  equivalent probability of having the final 
offer. 
In  order  to  allaw  for  what  Schelling  calls  "non  symmetry"  (in  opposition  to  Nash's 
syrnmetry) he  had to find a way of separating symmetry from  rationality.  'We must have a 
plausible definition of rationality that does not mention symmetry and show that asymmetry 
in  the  bargaining  expectations  would  be  inconsistent  with  that  definition. ,,27  Note  that 
Schelling ,,,,ants  to  shO\v  that it  is  not asymmetry that should be considered as rational but, 
\vhat he caUs, non symmetry. 
Schelling compares symmetry in game theory to a foot race where everybody runs exactly at 
the same  speed.  rf everyone is  as fast as everyone else and, "(  ... ) since a tie  is  a foregone 
conclusion,  why  would  they  bother  to  run?,,28  For  Schelling,  by  tying  rationality  to 
symmetry together, the game theorists are shooting themselves in the  foot.  In  effect, "( .. ) 
the  assumption  of complete  symmetry  of behavior  as  a  recognized  foregone  conclusion 
seems to preclude the very kind of action that might have seemed to enrich the game at the 
stage of preplay communication.,,29  For Schelling, symmetry not only does not permit the 
analysis of very interesting actions but can also become an obstacle to achieving a solution 
to a bargaining situation, thus limiting the chances for the players of  reaching an agreement. 
Before looking at ho\\', according to Schelling, symmetry can be an  obstacle to reaching an 
agreement  between  the  two  players,  one  has  to  unàerstand  how  Schelling  defines  an 
agreement. 
27 Schelling (1960a), p.  281 
28  Ibid, p.  281 
29 Ibid. p.  273 14 
Schelling  argues  that  the  notion  of agreement  has  never  been  sufficiently  examined,  or 
sufficiently operationalized (which  is  necessary for  Schelling since his aim  is  ta transpose 
his solution concept to real  bargaining situations).  Furthermore,  Schelling is  not satisfied 
with  Luce  and  Raiffa's  definition  of an  agreemeneo.  Their  definition  of a  trade  (or an 
agreement) is, "( ... ) an actual reapportionment of  the joint bundle of  goods held by them (the 
players),,31.  AIso, for Luce and Raiffa, a trade will take place only if  each player consents to 
it  and for a trade to occur, it has to respect the four assumptions Nash put forward, and that 
have been mentioned earlier.  Thus, they find Nash's solution concept acceptable. 
Schelling, however, believes that an agreement consists of two offers (one from each play·er) 
that are compatible.  In  order for the offers to  be compatible, the players must jointly claim 
what  is  available  for  them  to  divide  between  the  two  of them.  If the  offers  are  not 
compatible,  if  "the  two  players  have  claimed  more  then  is  availab!e"32,  there  is 
"disagreement" and if a disagreement occurs, the players receive nothing.  If the offers are 
compatible, an agreement is  reached and the players recelve what they  have agreed to.  For 
an agreement to be reached, there have to be only two current offers.  In  arder to insure that 
there are t"."o  and only two "cuITent offers", Schelling puts forth the idea that, a bell  cou!d 
ring to indicate to the players that there is  only enough time  for  them to prepare one final 
offer.  A third party,  a  referee  for  example, could then  examine each  player's  cUITent,  or 
final, offer and detennine if the offers are compatible.  The players do not really need to  be 
present in order to play the game.  They simply have to write down their final offers and the 
referee has to open the envelopes, when the time limit has expired and determine if the offers 
are  compatible.  The  game  loses  its  cooperative  and  move-symmetrical  aspects,  and  sa 
becomes a  tacit,  non  cooperative game.  There are  many  implications  to  this  conclusion, 
sorne of \-vhich will be exammed later on. 
We must now retum to the examination ofwhy symmetry is not oruy unnecessary but can be 
an obstacle to  achieving an  agreement.  For example,  if two  players  have  to divide  100 
objects between them, the agreement the two players reach must explicitly mention "which 
30 Luce and Raiffa (1957) cali a solution a trade, as for Schelling, a solution is an agreement.
 
31  Ibid, p.l24 (parenthesis mine)
 
32 Schelling (1960a), p.  269
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individual items go ta which individual players,,33  Sa, in arder ta reach an agreement, the 
players  must  propose  identical  divisions  of the  abjects.  The probability  of the  players 
reaching such an agreement is quite low, unless communication is  pennitted.  For Schelling, 
the player that would be able ta communicate the last offer would have a very big advantage. 
In effect, since the chances of  the players concerting their offers are sa low, the other player 
(the one that did not communicate the final  offer) would be forced  ta accept the last offer 
communicated thus giving the advantage ta the other player, simply for the sake of finding 
an agreement.  The pJayer is  expected ta agree, since, in arder ta respect rationality, he must 
act in  arder to  maximize his  utility.  But by  allowing the symmetrical behavior,  a  p!ayer 
would try ta dro'À'11  out al!  communication in  order to  not be able ta hear (understand) the 
other players'  offer,  thus  evacuating  preplay  communication  (and,  as  said  before,  what 
Schelling fll1ds  interesting). 
One  has  to  keep  in  mind that  what  Schelling  Vjas  tryil1g  to achieve  was  a  theory where 
players did  not have to  sertie for a tie through the bargaining rituai.  He was strivil1g  for a 
negotiation  mode!  that  allO\ved  players  ta actively  negotiate  and  ta  resolve  conflicts  by 
achieving a truly equitable solution. 
According ta Schelling, every negotiation situation has the potential of becoming a tacit non 
cooperative game.  Thus, there is  no  need for the symmetry axiom, as we have seen earlier. 
For example, in agame where two players (individuals) must divide 100$ between them and, 
at the end of the game, if the players anive at a solution \vhere player A  is  ta get 80$ and 
player B gets 20$, Schelling considers that such a solution does not contradict the rationality 
mie because; 
"Specifically, where is the 'error' in B's concession of$80 ta A?  He expected - he 
may tell us, and supposes we have roeans to check his veracity (a modest supposition 
if full  information ofutilities is already assumed  l)  - that A would 'demand' $80; he 
expected A to expect ta get $80; he  knew that A knew that he, B, expected to yield 
$80 and be content with $20; he knew that A knew that he knew this; and sa 00. ( ... ) 
Bath were correct in every expectation.,,34 
33  Schelling (1960a), p. 271 
34  Ibid, p.  281 16 
Schelling also adds that since there is an enonnous number of possibilities (9 999 if the  100$ 
is  to  be  divided  to  the  nearest  penny),  the  players  must be  "helped" by  sorne  kind  of 
"coordination  device".  This  is  where  focal  points  come  into  play.  Thus,  Schelling 
introduces  a  new  concept,  focal  points.  These  points  help  the  players  to  focus  on  one 
specific solution.  Focal points imply tacit communication. This is the reaSOn  why,  in  order 
to  have focal points, one  must allow for the existence of tacit communication and thus non 
symmetry;  '.( ... )  it  is  the  observable  phenomenon  of tacit  coordination  that  provides 
empirical evidence that (sometimes) rational expectations can be tacitly focused on a unique 
(and perhaps efficient) outcome, (, .. ),,35  The empirical evidence to  which Schelling refers 
will be treated later on.  What Schelling is saying is that players should not simply expect an 
outcome  which  corresponds to  that which  one  party deems  potentially  acceptable  to  the 
opposing  party.  The  players  should  accept the  power  of the  game  to  "dictate  its  own 
solution through their intellectual capacity to perceive  it  (... )36  The intellectuai capacity, 
Schelling is  referring to, is a concept that he calls focal points.  According to Schelling, what 
Nash's theory needs is simply "C,) the premise that a solution exists (..  )',.17 
Schelling thought, as did  Nash, that coordination was at the heart of negotiation problems. 
The solution to these problems is  not to impose artificial restrictions, nor does it cease to be a 
problem if the infonnation is perfect. 
"Most  bargaining situations  ultimately  involve  sorne  range  of possible  outcomes 
within each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at al\. 
In  such  a  situation  any  potential  outcome  is  one  from  which at least  one  of the 
parties,  an.d  probably  both,  would  have  been  willing  to  retreat  for  the  sake  of 
agreement,  and  very  often  the  other  party  knows  it.  Any  potential  outcome  is 
therefore one that either party could have improved by insisting: yet he may have no 
basis for  insisting, since the  other knows or suspects that he  would  rather concede 
than do without agreement.  ,,38 
35  Schelling (1960a), p. 289 
36  Ibid, p.  279 
37  Ibid, p. 289 
38  Ibid, p. 70 17 
Schelling emphasizes the dynamic aspects of negotiation.  His model  requires  no  artificial 
restrictions.  The only restrictions that are required are a time limit and the assurance that if 
players come to terms (before the deadline), the terms of the deal will be applied.  With these 
limited restrictions,  Schelling was able to show that equilibrium was possible in  games of 
negotiation and that this  equilibrium  was  similar to  the Nash  solution.  Ta explain these 
solutions, Schelling uses the focal  point concept.  Focal points imply that two partners (or 
enemies) without means of communication will  find an  identical solution ta a game.  This 
notion is also derived from, and presumes the relevance of, the rationality concept. 
1.3  Focal Points 
Figure  1: Map lhat was uscd by Schelli.ng
39 when conducting experiments on focal  points 
To better the understanding of focal  points, Schelling decided ta conduct experiments in his 
Harvard classes
40  For example, the students were given a situation: Two paratroopers, with 
no  means  of communication, only  have a  map of the  region  where they  are about ta be 
dropped and, must find a way to meet each other.  In arder to do sa, the p!ayers must fLOd the 
best  possible  meeting  point.  The  majority  of players  (students)  succeeded  in  finding  a 
common  meeting  place  on  the  map.  This  meeting  point  was  usually  a  bridge  or  an 
39 Schelling (1960a), p.  55 
40 It is not clear whether it is in an effort of trying ta praye the existence of focal points that Schelling 
conducted experiments or if it is after conducting these experiments that he discovered focal points. 18 
intersection.  Since  a  majority  of players  did  succeed  in  meeting  each  other,  Schelling's 
intuition, that focal points existed, was confirmed.  For a point to  have a focal quality, it has 
to  be unique.  In  the scenario illustrated above, there are a mL'nber  of houses  but only one 
bridge.  Thus the bridge is the focal point (simplicity is very important). 
Schelling  also  conducted  experiments  where  subjects  had  to  share  a  certain  amount  of 
money, 100$ for example.  If the amount was perfectly shared (that is to say that the sum of 
the parts was not greater then  100$),  the  players received what they had asked for.  What 
Schelling's experiment aUowed him to discover was that the amount was shared, more often 
then  not,  50/50 between  the players.  This  prompted  Schelling to see the 50/50 split as a 
focal point.  This finding seems to confirm the need for symmetry, as with Nash 's bargaining 
solution (in  fact the 50/50 split is  the Nash solution).  Schelling admits that in  bargaining 
games where players  must coordinate their offers to  win a  prize or obtain what they  have 
offered, the  results will, more often then not,  be  the  Nash solution.  Even  if this seems to 
contradict what Schelling is  trying ta do,  it  is  not  50.  It  is  the  focal  quality of the  Nash 
solution that renders it  sa attractive ta players and; "( ... ) !hat in  tum takes the heart out of 
any player in the explicit bargaining game who might hope that the expectations could focus 
anywhere e se.  1 
,,4\ 
Focal points are also a very important part of Schelling's discussion of arms control.  It is a 
subject that very  much  interested  Schelling between  1960  and  1961.  He  published  five 
articles and a book (co-authored by Morton Halperin) on  the subject.  Schelling's approach 
to arms control relies heavily on  tacit bargaining and is also very pragmatic (this applies to 
nearly ail the subjects he touches).  He preaches the control of arms, not their abolition.  The 
abolition  of arrns  would give way,  according to  Schelling, to  a very  unstable stance since 
there is  a very  big advantage conferred to the cheating party.  The cheating party does  not 
have to acquire a large quantity of arrns in order to gain a very big advantage on the honest 
party.  There follows a discussion of Schelling's study of arms control. 
41  Schelling (l960a), p.289 19 
1.4  The Theory of Conflict and Arms Control 
With the publication of "Surprise Attack and Disarrnament" in  The  Bulletin of  the  Atomic 
Scientist in  September 1959,  Schelling announced a small transition in  conflict theory.  His 
work would now inc!ude arrns control.  Schelling even tricd to get the public involved in the 
debate (see New York Times article, Appendix B).  One of  the impacts the Theory of Conflict 
could have would be hasty conclusions to confliets or wars.  The conflicts would be over 
before bath arms stockpiles were exJ.1austed.  11'Je advantages to an early conclusion to any 
kind of conDiet (conventional or nuc!ear) do not have to be enumerated, and neither does the 
fact  that  human lives  would be saved.  A!so,  Schelling may  have  wantcd  to study  arms 
control for another reason.  Being an inforrned and well-read man, he must have known of 
the rcasons for the rise of  the Third Reich in Germany in the 1930's.  One ofthe reasons was 
that the German people feh humiliated by the Versailles Treaty of 1918 and especially by the 
clause that limited their anny to  100000 men; "But what hurt the most was that Versailles 
virtually disarmed Germany and thus, for the time being anyway, barred the way to German 
hegemony  in  Europe,,42  However,  having  anus  left  over  brings  on  the  probiem  of 
controlling thcm and monitoring them. 
Milita!), technology changes at a very fast pace and negotiations between the U.S  and the 
USSR,  for  exampJe  took  very  long  periods  of time.  ln  fact  according  to  Schelling, 
negotiations take 50 much time that it is nearly impossible to reach a deal. 
'We  and  the  Russians  are  trapped  by  our  military  technology.  Weapon 
developments of the  last fifteen  years, especially of the  last seven  or eight,  have 
themselves been responsible for the  most alarming aspects of the present strategie 
situation.  They have enhanced the  advantage,  in  the  event war should  come,  of 
being the one to start il. ,43 
Thus, we are somewhat the slaves of our own creations.  Schelling adds, "(... ) nature rnight 
have been kinder in the way she let our military technology unfold itself over the last decade 
42  Shirer (1960), p. 58 
43  Schelling (1960b) 20 
and a half."44  Before the parties negotiate a deal that is  acceptable to both (a deal that does 
not give undue advantage to any party), changes (in weapon technology, for exarnple) could 
occur and  negotiations  would  have to start ail  over again.  One  way  of making  a  deal, 
according to  Schelling is  to  use tacit communication.  In  fact,  that is  what happened  with 
nuclear  testing,  "( ... )  (a)  moratorium  resulted  from  no  detailed  negotiations,  no  careful 
specifications, and no written documents to be initialed and ratified. ,,45  The moratorium was 
not the  result of a  summit conference.  Schelling proposes that one of the  parties  act (or 
abstain from acting) and dare the other party into doing the same.  Once again this kind of 
deal  is  subject to focal points and tacit communication.  Simplicity as always, is to be used. 
It  IS  rarely  possible to  communicate  matters of degree  whereas the  fact  that  one  abstains 
from a certain action is easily communicated. 
Schelling (like Halperin)  even thinks that there  should  be room for  interpretation  in  anns 
treaties.  There should be room for tacit communication and tradition in these treaties, "(.. ) 
It  is  not necessarily true that every effort should be made to make the agreement as detailed 
as possible ()',46 
Pursuing his  ideas on anns control, Schelling proposes what he calls a Special Surveillance 
Force  that would be  established  in  parallel with the Russians and perhaps other countries. 
Its  purpose would  be  to  "observe the enemy's behavior,  at the  enemy's invitation, and to 
report  home  instantly through authentic channels.  ,,47  It  \Vas  to  be an  idea that Schelling 
would pursue over the next few years.  The importance of  communication and focal points is 
once again put forth.  In  effect, since the Force could act as an intennediary, the messages 
that each  party wished  to  convey  would get through  without any  distortions.  The Force 
would also be able to  investigate suspicious incidents such as a nuclear meltdown, so as to 
assure  their  respective  countries  that  the  incident  was  truly  an  accident  and  was  not  a 
provocation.  Schelling  admits  that the  establishment of such  a  force  would  be  difficult, 
though worth a try. 
44 Schelling (l960b) 
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Aware  that  the  idea of the  Special Surveillance  Force  was  not  catching  on,  Schelling's 
further work focused  on the raie that NATO could play.  He thought that it  could perhaps 
have a  raie  similar ta,  though  smaller than,  his Special Surveillance  Force.  But  he  also 
wanted ta stabilize the alliance, since he thought that there were two different pressures on 
the members of the Atlantic Alliance; one was that the members wanted ta  have the widest 
range of action possible and  the other that NATO could  only be effective through  mutual 
responsibility. 
Focal points are also of particular interest for the Theory of Conflict since they can be used 
10 situations of Iimited war, ""hich is  a conflict where participants respect certain boundaries 
(the boundaries can  be  implicit or explicit).  For Schelling,  it  is  possible for two parties ta 
respect  certain  limits  without  explicit  communication.  Implicit  communication  (or  tacit 
bargain.ing)  uses  focal  points  since players  respect  certain  boundaries  that  are  not  to  be 
crossed, \vithout explicitly communicating them. 
1.5  The TheOl-Y of Conflict and AccidentaI wars or surprise attacks 
ln the early 60's, Schelling \Vas  also preoccupied with accidentai wars.  Before discussing 
Schelling's work on accidentai wars, one might ask: What is an accidentai war?  Firstly, one 
has to specify that accidents do not cause wars.  People do, by the decisions they make. "The 
point  is  that  accidents  do  not  cause  war.  Decisions  cause  war,,48  A  definition  of an 
accidentai war could be:  a  conflict that is  not  explicitly caused by  one of the  parties (or a 
third party) involved, but by an accident that could not be contrailed by any of the parties. 
Schelling attempts to  demonstrate that tacit communication and  focal  points  play a  major 
raie in  the avoidance of accidentaI conflict and in  support of anns contrai (as we shall see, 
one goes with the other).  Tbe importance of avoiding accidentai wars is  self-evident; bath 
parties could destroy one anotheï.  The US. could destroy the USSR, and the reverse is also 
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true.  Aiso true,  is  that if one of the involved parties decided to launch an attack, the other 
would be under the obligation to respond in at least an equivalent manner.  Since both parties 
have the capability of destroying one another (and  the rest of the world for  that matter'), 
what would  be  the importance of who attacked whom?  What is  important is  to  know that 
none of the  involved parties  is  interested  in  surviving the  other by  a da/
9  This type of 
affirmation  brings  to  mind  Albert Wohlstetter's concept of the  "Balance of Terror"so  (to 
which there  will  be  a  later  reference  because of his  influence  on  the  Air  Force while at 
RAND).  Wohlstetter, in his  1959 article, says that as long as none of the parties is assured 
of surviving the  other's attack,  no  party would  want (or be tempted) to  launch an  attack. 
This Balance of Terror is  an illustration of such a situation.  The balance is  fundamentally 
stable: there is stability as long as none of the parties involved finds a way to render his arms 
or population invulnerable to the opponent's attack.  The invulnerability could be caused by 
one's  first-strike  capabilities  or  a  higWy  efficient  civil  defense  program
51  Were  there 
invulnerability, then the balance would not be stable, it would lean to one side since it could 
lead  to  a  preference  towards  a  counterforce  strategy  and  subsequently  lead  to  world 
destruction. 
Another important factor in  Schelling' discussion of accidentai wars is the reaction time.  If 
one of the parties could give itself time to verify whether the presumed attack is  real  or not, 
the risks of an accidentai war happening would be much less.  One of the ways of increasing 
the reaction time  is  by  protecting one's attack capabilities against an aggression.  Ellsberg 
also worked on  this type of problem, as  was  said before.  There are many ways to  protect 
one's attack capabilities; for example, one could put them underground.  With the arms weil 
protected one could assure oneselfthat the presumed attack is indeed truc. 
One has  to admit that the "wait and see" reaction seems  improbable, but what Schelling is 
trying to  accomplish,  is  to  stabilize the bala...'1ce  as  much  a.s  possible,  ta  use Wohlstetter's 
concept.  The risks of an accidentai war are exponentialiy augmented if one calmot wait and 
see, 
49 This type of affirmation is recurrent in the literatme.
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 23 
\ 
"Ifa country's retaliatory weapons are reasonab!y secure against surprise attack, pre­
emptive or premeditated, it need not respond so quickly.  Not only can one wait and 
see, but one can assume that the enemy himself, knowing that one can wait and see, 
is  less afraid of a precipitate decision, less preoccupied with his  own  need  to pre­
empt. ,,52 
The balance image is frequently used to describe the position of the superpowers during the 
second ha!f of the nventieth century. 
Another area where tacit communication plays a major raie is  in the prevention of surprise 
attacks. Once again, it is by using tacit communication that one can assure one's enemy that 
the Balance of Terrar will remain stable. 
According to Schelling the best \vay of minimizing the risks of an accidentai \Var  is  to  have 
the other party perceive that a preemptive attack is  highly improbable.  Preemption should 
never be a conservative stance.  Tacit communication plays  a major role  in  achicving this 
goal since the enemy is  a!ways watching.  One has to commurucate a pacifistic (or at least 
non-aggressive)  attitude through  one's actions.  Once again  simplicity  is  very  important. 
The parallel with the second Gulf War is evident (for sorne at least) since the reason that was 
gi ven for the war \Vas  that Sadam Hussein represented a c1ear and present danger to world 
security.  The  United  States  and  its  allies  had  ta  assure  themselves  that  the  threat  was 
eliminated before he (Hussein) could commit another aggression.  The decision to launch a 
r  preemptive attack  \Vas  a  necessity because  nothing  in  the actions  of the  Hussein regime 
indicated a  pacifistic stance.  Ail  the different elements that compose tacit communication 
indicated a high probability of aggressive acts,  the  reputation of the Hussein  regime being 
what it was (war with Iran, massacres of the Kurd minority and the Kuwait invasion)'3 
52 Sçhelling (1960c)
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One can also use tacit communication to analyze the "open-skies" policy.  In  1955, President 
Eisenhower proposed this policy to the Soviet Union govemment.  It was original in that it 
did not consider the possession of arms as being provocative as  long as they were "held in 
reserve".  Thus anns possession is compatible with deterrence.  Not only is it compatible but 
weapons are an important part of deterrence.  Tacit communication was present, "(... ),  it can 
be  more  important  to  see  that  the  enemy  is  not  guessing  about  our  intentions  taward 
initiating surprise attack.  ,,54  One must leave as little room as possible for interpretation; by 
doing this the enemy is not tempted ta attack in self-defense.  Under these circumstances, the 
notion of self-defense  becomes  a  little  bit  tricky.  If one's  enemy  feels  sure he  is  being 
attacked, he will preempt the attack himself by attacking first.  If one knows that his enemy 
1S  sure of being attacked, one will  attack, sa as ta preempt the enemy's preemptive attack, 
and so on.  Sînce the stakes are sa high, one must assure oneself that this does not happen. 
Thus deterrence takes on a whole new importance. 
The  "open  skies"  policy  relied  heavily  on  tacit  communication.  Its  motive  was  ta 
communicate the message that the U.S. did  not have first-strike capability but only counter­
attack capability.  The enemy  had  to be assured that  he  would  not  be attacked.  Thus the 
underiying  reason  for  such  a  policy  was  that  maybe  there  were  sorne  capabilities  one 
preferred not to have; "(  ... ) there are not only secrets we prefer not ta keep, but even military 
capabilities we might prefer not to have. ,,55 
Sa far,  we have seen that stability is  an  important factor  in  Schelling's conception of the 
Theory of Conflict; we have aisa seen that ta achieve this stability one has ta rely heavily on 
tacit communication. 
Now, let us  tum our attention to  the other economist that worked on conflict theory at that 
time,  Daniel  Ellsberg.  We  begin  with  a  short  biographical  note  that  will  help  better 
understand his impact on the theory. 
54 Schelling (1959), p. 413 
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DANIEL ELLSBERG 
Daniel Ellsberg was born in  1931  in Chicago, Illinois.  ln 
1946, when Ellsberg was  15,  he  lost  his  mother and sister 
to a car accident in which he also broke his leg.  His father 
\Vas  the driver; the family was coming back from Fourth of 
July celebrations.  While reminiscing about this chapter of 
his  life,  Ellsberg  remembers  having  a  strange  thought. 
While 100king at the wreckage and knowing what had just 
happened to ms mother and sister, he thought "Now 1don't 
have to be a pianist anymore.  ,,56 
Ellsberg  went  on  to  study  economlCS  at  Harvard  University  (on  a  Pepsi-Cola  Co. 
scholarship) between 1949 and  1952.  Ellsberg was, by  his own accord, a Cold War liberal: 
he admired Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.  Labor economics was his first love, or at 
least this is  where ms love for the field of economics came from,  but, early on, he  became 
fascinated  with the field of decision theory:  the abstract analysis of decision making under 
uncertainty.  It  was in  this field  that he  would eventually have a  lasting impact.  Ellsberg 
went  ta  Cambridge  on  a  Woodrow  Wilson  fellowship  for  graduate  studies.  He  then 
undertook milita!)! training in the Marine Corps, because he thought it was ms responsibility 
to do sa, "(... ) when 1returned from  England, 1thought it was time ta do my  duty. ,,57  He 
returned to Harvard in  1957 to complete his PhD in decision theory  The time he spent with 
the  Marines (3  years) left him with "(  ... ) a respect for the military, an interest in  strategy, 
and a greater readiness to apply intellectual concepts ta military problems tha.l1  l would have 
felt  otherwise".  His academic interests had  obvious applications to problems related  with 
military strategy (as did Schelling's).  He then applied for and received an invitation from 
56  Lukas (1971) 
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the Economies  Department of the RAND Corporation,  in  Santa Monica,  Califomia, "( ... ) 
with  a  sense of privilege and  dedication,  despite  my intense  personal aversion  ta nuclear 
weapons,,58.  This rapidly led on ta bigger and better things. 
When only 28  years of age, between March  loth and March 31 st,  1959,  Ellsberg was invited 
ta give a series of lectures at Harvard, in the Lowell Lectures series, under the rubric "The 
Art of  Coercion: A Study of  Threats in Economic Conflict and War".  Two of the lectures 
were given  in  Henry  Kissinger's seminar on  international  relations.  These  were  entitled 
"The Theory and Practice of Blackmail" (given  on  March  IOth,  1959)  and  "The Political 
Uses of Madness" (given on March 26th, 1959).  They were an anaJ.ysis of Hitler's coercive 
diplomacy against Austria and Czechoslovakia in  1937: an attempt at fonnalizing the use of 
blackmail.  These lectures prompted Schelling's admiration and caused him ta affinn that, 
"Progress  is  being  made,,59  (in  the  field  of conflict theory).  More than  a  decade  later, 
Kissinger was ta say that these lectures had provided him with a conceptual model of how ta 
deal with Vietnam and bargaining in general (ta Ellsberg's later dismayl). 
From  the  summer of 1959,  he  became  a  permanent  employee  at  RAND  and  chose  to 
specialize in an issue which he had come ta believe ta be crucial ta the avoidance of nuclear 
war:  "the command and control of nuclear retaliatory forces by senior military officers and 
especially by the president".  In arder for him ta work on this issue, he was provided a great 
deal of access ta strategie military information including "knowledge of sorne of the  most 
highly protected and closely held secrets in our military structure.  These included milita!)l 
plans for general nuclear \Var  that \Vere  generally inaccessible even ta the highest civilian 
authorities.  ,,60 
This knowledge included the top secret estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the everrt 
of general nuclear war with the Communist bloc, American nuclear weapons v,rere  expected 
ta kill  five  ta  six  hundred  million  people,  most of them  in  the first  few  days.  He  was 
stunned; 
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"A hundred Holocausts (... ) It was the Joint Chiefs of Staffs best estimate of the 
actual  results,  in  terms of human fatalities,  of our setting into  motion the  existing 
machinery for  implanting the  current operational plans of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff 
for general war (...) 1still remember holding that graph in my hand and looking at it 
in  an office of the White House annex in  the Executive Office Bureau on a spring 
day in  1961.  1 was thinking: This piece of  paper, what this piece of paper represents, 
should  not  exist.  It  should  never  in  the  course of human  history  have  come  to 
exist.,,6\ 
Inorder to  have access to  the  documents  mentioned  above,  Ellsberg had to  work  in  the 
Pentagon.  I-Ijs  presence  in  the  U.S.  capital  allowed  hjm  to  become a  consultant  for  the 
Department of Defense and the White House 
Ellsberg stopped working for RAND  in  1964 to join the Department of Defense as Special 
Assistant  to  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  John  McNaughton  (who  was  Schelling's 
protégë
2
).  McNaughton's sole responsibility at the time was the Vietnam conflict.  Ellsberg 
then transferred to the Statc Department in  1965  in  order to  spend the next two years at the 
the  V.S.  Embassy  in  Saigon.  On his  retum from  Vietnam,  El!sberg  rejoined  the  RAND 
Corporation.  It was during this time that Ellsberg worked on McNamara's Top Secret Us. 
Decision Making in  Vietnam.  1945-1968, which would later become the Pentagon Papers. 
Daniel Ellsberg leaked more top secret documents into the public domain than anyone else 
before Vasili  Mitrokhin brought the KGB's secret archives to the West.  Ellsberg revealed 
the secrets of the Pentagon and the White House in  relation to  the  war in  Vietnam - the 
Pentagon Papers as they became known.  These are regarded as having precipitated both the 
end of  Congressional support for the war (thus the end of  the Vietnam War) and the dovmfall 
of President Nixon. 
In order to better comprehend Ellsberg's interest and contribution to conflict theOl)', we must 
underst.and the ongins of his dissatisfaction towards game theory.  The following section will 
analyze Ellsberg's dissatisfaction with the minimax theorem. 
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2.1  Daniel Ellsberg and the origins of conflict theory 
Unlike Schelling's, Ellsberg's dissatisfaction with game theory was not aimed at John Nash; 
it  was  aimed at von  Neumann and  Morgenstern.  More  precisely,  he  was  dissatisfied  with 
their  use  of the  rationality concept  under  uncertainty.  He  also  criticized  their  use  of the 
fictitious  player device  for  the  transformation of non-zero-sum games  into  zero-sum games 
as that gave way to  imprecise solutions in  the "Theory of the  Reluctant Duelist", published 
in  1956.  Ellsberg first  asked the  question "ls it useful  to  cali  a player irrational because he 
decides to use a non-minimax strategy?,,63  This article lays the basis for ail his later work in 
decision theory and especially for  the work  that is of particular interest to us,  in  the Theory 
of Conflict.  Ellsberg's treatment of the  question of rationality under uncertainty,  solution 
concepts and the use of apparent irrationality was  quite novel and can  be  directly linked ta 
conflict theO/y.  Ellsberg was immediately noticed for his work. 
To  better understand Ellsberg's work,  here  is  a very  brief discussion of von  Neumann and 
Morgenstern's work and the minimax theorem. 
2.2  Von Neumann and Morgenstern's work and the minimax 
theorem 
In the  Theory of  Games and Economie Behavior,  first  published  in  1944
64
,  von  Neumann 
and Morgenstern set out to  develop "(  ..  ) a theory of rational behavior in a social  exchange 
economy,,65. 
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Thus, von Neumann and Morgenstern were concerned with the analysis of the behavior of 
individuals,  and the coalitions which they may be tempted to  form in order to better their 
positions and utility level.  One of the most important achievements of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern was the solution concept called the stable set.  This solution is first described in 
section (4.1.2) of Theory of  Games and Economie Behavior.  ''The immediate concept of a 
solution is plausibly a set of rules for each participant which tell him how to behave in every 
situation  which  may  conceivably  arise"66  Von  Neumann and  Morgenstern  continue  by 
saying, "( ... ) the complicated catalogue - which we expect from a solution- permits a  very 
brief and significant summarization of how much the participant under consideration can get 
ifhe behaves rationally.,,67  ll1e authors admit that there is a chance that a solution could not 
be very precise since they rerer to it as a "complicated catalog".  This lack of precision was 
criticized by Ellsberg,  though  he  was  not the  only  one.  One can refer to Carl  Kaysen's 
review of the Theory of  Games and Economie Behavior (Kaysen, 1948), to see that this was 
troublesome for him also.  On the other hand, the authors say that it is done deliberately so as 
to include mayes that could be considered as irrational by the other players, "( ... ) including 
those  "",here  'the  others'  behave  irrationally.  (... ),,68  They  then  proceed  to  extend  the 
definition oftheir solution concept to all  participants simultaneous!y 
"Consider these amounts which the several participants 'obtain'.  If the solution did 
nothing  more  in  the quantitative sense than specify these amounts, then  it  would 
coincide with the weil known concept of an imputation: it would just state how the 
total proceeds are to be distributed among the participants.,,69 
The authors point out that, in many situations, there is no single imputation (which is simply 
a set ofnumbers showing the distribution of  the total gain among the players), though it must 
be clear that a  solution, or a  stable-set,  is  a  sub-set of ail the possible imputations.  Sorne 
situations (or games) have many stable sets (thus, the impreciseness).  The stable set that will 
eventually be chosen by the piayer will heavily be inf1uenced bl' \vhat the authors cali the 
bargaining powers of the players and the standards of behavior (which will be treated later 
66  Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), p.  31 
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on) in a society.  The notion of  "bargaining powers" draws criticism from Kaysen (as weil as 
Ellsberg) and again in his review he wrote; 
"This  reference  to  'bargaining powers'  IS  Just  an  indication  of the  nature  of the 
forces  which determine the  parameter.  A complete theory would specify in  detail 
these forces and their weights, thus leading to a single price (or perhaps a probability 
distribution ofprices as the solution).,,70 
In  order to build the stable set, the authors of  the Theory ofGames and Economie Behavior 
introduce the notion of  domination.  An imputation is  said ta be dominant if the players that 
choose this imputation are better off than if they chose another strategy, which is  said to be 
dominated.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern desciibed the reiationship of dominance of one 
imputation over another, as the following: 
"Assume that society, i.e. the totahty of al! participants, has to consider the question 
whether or not to 'accept' a  static settlement of ail questions of distribution by  the 
imputation y.  Assume furthermore that at this moment the alternative settlement by 
the imputation x.  is  also considered.  Then tms alternative x wiii suffice to  exclude 
acceptance of y.  By this we mean that a sufficicnt number of participants prefer in 
then own interest x to y, and are convinced or can be convinced of the possibility of 
obtaining advantages ofx.,,71 
Thus x dominates y,  since  a  player  or a  coalition cannot,  if he  or it  is  to  be  considered 
rational, choose y over x. 
The notion  of dominance  aiiows  von Neumann and  Morgenstern to  give what they  cal!  a 
"precise definition  of a  solution"  (it  is  the  title  of section  4.5  of Theory  of Gomes  and 
Economie Behavior).  A solution must have two properties, the first is  in reference to what 
could be callcd "internai" stability, the relationship of an imputation to other imputations in 
the stable set.  The second property tS  ln refeïence to "extemal"  stability: the rclationship of 
imputations of  the stable set to imputation that are not included in the stable set.  Or, as the 
authors say; "A set S of elements (imputations) is a solution when it has the following two 
properties: 
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(4:A:a) No y contained in Sis dominated by an x contained in S 
(4:A:b) Every y not contained in S is dominated by sorne x contained in S"n 
The  authors go on to say  that the  two properties can be  merged  into  one which  is:  "The 
elements of S are precisely those elements which are undominated by the elements of S"n 
As  one can  notice,  the  authors  may  have  titled  section  4.5  'The Precise  Definition of a 
Solution",  it  does not  mean the  number of possible outcomes is  not very great.  As  stated 
before, it is the number ofoutcomes that has been criticized. 
What von Neumann and Morgenstern thought could help i1lustrate the stable sets is  a notion 
they called "accepted standards of behavior".  The idea behind these standards of behavior 
was  that  certain  solutions  would  be  rejected  on  the  basis  that they  would  be  thought as 
immoral or unsporting by the participants of the game.  As von Neumann and Morgenstern 
say, "Indeed, it appears that the sets of imputations S which we are considering corresponà 
to  the  'standards of behavior'  connected with a  social  organization-,74  One  must keep  in 
mind that von  Neumann and  I\10rgenstern are  looking for a theory that will  explain  social 
behavior.  But one can still ask:  "what do standards of behavior really mean?"  It seems ta 
mean that in  reality any stable set might be accepted by sorne society if the  people in that 
society could develop explanations for why it  was the right way to behave, thus developing 
rules and norms to cnsure that people behave accordingly.  The following game, used by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, will help illustrate the concept of 'standards ofbehavior'.  It will 
also help  illustrate the notion of 'bargaining abilities'.  "Each player,  by  a personal  move, 
chooses the number of one of the two other players.  Each one makes his choice uninformed 
about the choices of  the two other players ,,75 The following matrix represents the payoffs of 
- the players
76: 
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Player 
1  2  3 
1,2  0,5  0,5  -1 
Coalition  1,3  0,5  -1  0,5 
2,3  -1  0,5  0,5 
Figure 2:  Von Neumann and Morgenstern example of a three player zero-sun] game 
If!Wo players choose each other's number they  will  receive one half unit  each.  while the 
player who is  excluded loses one unit.  Such agame has one stable set that permits  three 
possible  imputations and as von  Neumann and  Morgenstern  write,  "Which of these  three 
possible coalitions will form is  beyond the scope of the theory, - at kast at the present stage 
(. .. ),,77  What the authors mean by "at least at the present stage" is  they have yet to  present 
the notion of 'standards of behavior'.  By introducing the notion, the authors '..vish to better 
describe the formation of coalitions in society 
In effect. one of the stable sets to a slightly different game from the one mentioned abovc, a 
game where  communication between the  players  v'ould  be  permitted,  is  self evident. 
players form a coalition in  order to "squeeze" one of  the players out.  If, for example player 
2 and 3 decided to form a  coalition in order to,  as von  Neumann and Morgenstern cali  it, 
discriminate against player l, they would receive 0,5  unit each and player  1 would lose  1 
unit.  Now,  in  a  more  general  game,  or in  society,  if two  players  form  a  coalition  and 
discriminate  against  another  player,  the  amount  the  coalition  would  assign  to  the 
discriminated player would becorne the standard of behavior. 
So,  the  standard of behavior refers  not  so  much  to  the  formation of a  coalition as  to  the 
amount  such a  coalition can appropriate for itself (or. which cornes to the same thing, the 
amount  it  must  leave  to  the  excluded  player).  The  distribution,  between  the  two 
discriminating players, of the amount they assigned to the discriminated player depends on 
v,,'hat von Neumann and Morgenstern cali "(. .. ) their bargaining abilities (... )"78. 
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Having  examined  what a  solution  consists  of,  we  must  look  at how  one  arrives  at the 
different imputations that compose the solution.  ln order to identif)' the possible imputations 
one must assume players use a minimax strategy, "(..  ) the minimax theorem- without which 
no theory ofgames can be said to exist.,,79 
As  has just been  mentioned, the starting point of the  mathematical theory of games is  the 
situation in  which the outcome of the game is determined by the strategies employed by the 
players.  Each player in a game will try to maximize his or her gains and minimize his or her 
losses.  The  minimax theorem states  that for  every !wo-person  zero-sum  game,  a  mixed 
strategy eXlsts  for  each player such that the expected payoff of bath  is  the  same value  V 
when  players  use  these  strategies.  Furthermore,  V  is  the  best  payoff each  player could 
expect  to  receive  from  playing  the  game;  hence  these  mixed  strategies  are  the  optimal 
strategies  for  the  two players  to  employ.  Ellsberg's dissatisfaction  lies  in  the use of the 
theorem by von Neumann and Morgenstern. 
Firstly,  in  order to  better understand  El!sberg's critique of the  minimax theorem,  we  must 
examine Ellsberg's critique ofl/on Neumann and Morgenstern's way offinàing a solution to 
situations that involve uncertainty  ln effect, what von Neumann and Morgenstern propose 
in a situation where information is not perfect, is the use of  the minimax strategy.  In arder to 
prove  this  they  use  a  situation  that  involves  two  games.  They  name r  agame where 
information is not perfect; 
"The difficulty in  analyzing r  is  clearly that the player  l, in choosing LI  does  not 
know  what choice  L2  of the  player 2 he  is  going  to  face  and vice  versa.  Let us 
therefore compare r with other games where this difficult)' does not arise"so 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern go on to say that; 
'The introduction of these two games LI and tz achieves this: it üught ta be evident 
by common sense - and we shaH also establish it by an exact discussion - that for L1 
79 Luce and Raiffa (1957), p.2 
80  Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), p.lOO 34 
and  'C2  the  best way of playing - i.e.  the  concept of rational  behavior - has  clear 
meaning.,,81 
The two games ('CI and "t2) are called the minorant and the majorant games.  In the first game, 
the  majorant game, player 1 must choose first,  player 2 then chooses in  full  knowledge of 
what player  1 has  done.  In  effect, since player 1 is  known to be  rational,  the uncertainty 
aspect of the game is evacuated.  Player 2 will choose the minimum element contained in the 
strategy player 1 will have chosen.  This allows Ellsberg to say that player 1 should choose 
the  "(. .. ) maximin strategy corresponding to the largest row of minima"s2  In  the second 
game, the  majorant game, player 2 must choose before player  1.  Again,  since player  1 IS 
kno\\'J1 to be rational, the uncertainty aspect is  evacuated.  Thus, Ellsberg writes; 'The only 
strategy  which  is  rationally  consistent with  his  belief C.. ) is  his  minimax  strategy, C.. ) 
which guarantees him the best possible outcome,,83  But for  Ellsberg, this does  not solve 
anything since what von NeumaIU1 and Morgenstern are essentiaJly saying is that, in agame 
which involves uncertainty, "( ... ) each player should choose as though he were moving first 
in a minorant (or a majorant) game, and as if he were certain that bis opponent were rational 
aJld  it1formed,,84  Thus,  the  players  must  use  the  minimax  strategy as  if they  were  in  a 
situation of perfect information.  This is  unsatisfactory to Ellsberg since, "Uncertainty is  a 
state of mind, a property of belief or expectation; if it is present it cannot simply be 'assumed 
away' ,,85  ln such a situation, according to Ellsberg, the minimax strategy is  but one of the 
possible strategies one could use when faced with uncertainty. This is  the root of Ellsberg's 
critique;  the  players  could and would use  different  strategies.  Thus the  minimax cannot 
precisely predict, or explain the behavior of a player in a situation where there is uncertainty, 
"(  ... ) other strategies may offer the  possibility of dazzlingly superior outcomes, combined 
with minimum outcomes barely below the maximin."86 
81  Von Newnann and Morgenstern (1953), p.lOO 
82 Ellsberg (1956) 
83  Thid 
84 Thid 
85  Thid 
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Ellsberg admits that the minimax has its merits, "(  ... ) the certainty of achieving an outcome 
which is at least better than the worst possible (i.e., the lowest element in the matrix).,,87  On 
the  other hand,  the  solution  concept that von Neumann  and  Morgenstern  created  pushes 
aside strategies that could offer better outcomes. 
Accordingly, Ellsberg asks: "Is it useful to cali a player irrational because he decides to use a 
non  minima.x  strategy?"  In  order  to  a!1SWer  this  question,  Ellsberg  uses  an  example; 
considering the payoff matrix below,  if both players were to  use a  minimax strategy, the 
payoff would  be  O.  This  is  also  true  if only one of the  players was to  use  the  minimax 
strategy 
B 
B-l  B-2  B-3 
A-1  10  0  -10 
A  A-2  0  0  0 
A-3  -10  0  10 
Figure 3: Ellsberg exa..ruple of a situation where the use of the muumax strategy IS nol necessanly rational 
1 
In effect,  if player A  was to choose a  non  minimax  strategy, for  example A-l, player B, 
assuming he was rational, would choose lUs  minimax strategy which is B-2.  Player A would 
then get exactly the same payoff he would have received had he acted rationally and played 
A-2.  The same reasoning applies if player B chooses a non minimax strategy and the other 
player acts rationally. The payoff would again be  O.  As  Ellsberg says, "(  ... ) there seems to 
be  no convincing grounds for  saying that these choices  would be  unreasonable.,,88  Thus, 
Ellsberg shows that in  this  particular case,  it  is  not irrational  for  a  player ta choose a non 
mmimax strategy. 
This  brings  Ellsberg ta a subject that will  later allow him to  wnte his  1961  article "Risk, 
Ambiguity,  and  the Savage Axioms".  According to von  Neumann and  Morgenstern,  the 
87 Ellsberg (1956) 
88 Ibid 36 
players' behavior should not  be affected if the payoffs were linearly transformed.  Ellsberg, 
on the other hand,  contends that, in  reality, players would probably not behave in  the same 
way if they have  1$ at stake as opposed to 1000$.  (This has become known  as the Ellsberg 
Paradox and will be discussed in the next section.) 
After showing that the  non-use of the  minimax strategy in  uncertainty does  not  necessarily 
imply irrational behavior on the part of the players, EIISberg applies himself to show that the 
minimax  is  not  a  satisfactory  solution  concept.  The  minimax  strategy  represents,  for 
Ellsberg "(  .. ) the psychology of a timid man pressed into a duel. ,,89  (Hence, the title of his 
1956 article.)  Were a player to use the minimax strategy in a game, he  would essentially be 
taking  a  defensive  stance.  This  prompts  Ellsberg  to  ask;  "When  did  'rational"  become 
synonymous with  'defensive'?"90  A player,  knowing that his  counterpart will  choose  the 
strategy that implies  the  highest payoff,  should choose a strategy that  implies  the  smallest 
lost. 
Ellsberg goes on to ask, "Just what does this 'solution' solve?,,91  Much of the work done on 
the theory of the two-person zero-sum game, up to the publication of this article. was related 
ta the "numerical computation of von  Neumann 's saddlepoint solution.,,92 One  has  the right 
to ask the question and  Ellsberg's answer could be summed up  this  way:  not much.  In  fact, 
the use of this solution concept reflects "( ... ),  the psychology of a timid man pressed into a 
duel,,93  and  that,  "( ..  )  it  could  not  be  reliable  in  predicting  behavior  in  situations 
corresponding to  the  zero-sum  two-person game;  nor  is  it  plausible that players should  be 
advised to conform to it against their inclinations.,,94 
Thus, Ellsberg voiced serious doubts towards the minimax theorem.  He did  not think that it 
reflected correctly what could be observed in reality.  The next section discusses what is now 
known as the Ellsberg Paradox. 
H9 Elisberg (1956) 
90 Ibid 
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2.3  The Ellsberg Paradox 
Ellsberg raises what was later called the Ellsberg Paradox in  his  1961  critique of  the Savage 
Axioms,  "Risk,  Ambiguity  and  the  Savage  Axioms"  and  his  subsequent  thesis  "Risk, 
Ambiguity an.d  Decision" in  1962.  The Savage Axioms consist of  four postulates which are: 
P 1:  Complete ordering of  gambles or "actions". 
P2: The choice between two actions must be unaffected by the value of payoffs 
corresponding to events for which bath actions have the same payoffs (i.e, by 
the value of  payoffs in a constant column). 
P3:  Corresponding to  "admissibility",  the  rejection of dominated actions  (this 
particular postulate was considered as non-controversial by Ellsberg). 
P4: The independence of  probabilities and payoffs 
These  postulates  are normative criteria  and  should  be  able to predict certain  behavior in 
particular situations as we!! as "ref1ective behavior" in  those particular situations.  But \Vhat 
Ellsberg  says  is  that they  do  not  have  predictive  capability  in  situations  where  there  is 
uncertainty.  He proves this, with what is  known as the three-calor um problem (it is  often 
referred ta as the Ellsberg Paradox
9S
).  This problem could be described as follows: Consider 
an um containing 90 balls, 30 of which are known to be red.  The rernaining balls are black 
and  yellow  balls  in sorne  unknown proportion.  The following  figures  describe a  pair of 
decision problerns each involving a choice between two options.  A  baIl  is  drav.n from the 
um and the player gets 100$ or 0$, depending on the color of the bail drawn and the option 
the subject has chosen. 
95  Ellsberg does not think of it as a paradox but simply as a counter-example. 38 
30  60 
Red  Black  Yellow 
Option  1  100 $  0$  0$ 
Option 2  0$  100 $  0$ 
30  60 
Red  Black  Yellow 
Option 3  100 $  0$  100 $ 
Option 4  0$  100$  100 $ 
Figure 4:  Illustration of the Ellsberg Paradox % 
Eilsberg asks his  readers to  choose which of the preceding options they prefer.  He claims 
that if the reader favors option lover option 2 and option 4 over option 3, he is  normal since 
that  is  the  behavior most  people  choose.  Since  the  probabilities  and  the  payoffs are the 
same, he dcmonstrates that there is a readiness to violate Pl, or what EIIsberg caUs the Sure 
Thing Principle.  Thus, the Savage Axioms are not universally applicable for predicting and 
analyzing  behavior  of ail  rational  agents  in  situations  involving  uncertainty.  Eilsberg 
suggests that modifications are needed to the expected utility model  and also to the axioms 
The Sure Thing Principle,  or characteristics resembling it,  resurface as postulates in the von 
Neumann and  Morgenstern theory.  In fact,  Ellsberg suggests that one may wish to impose 
restrictions on the lise of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms.  He recommends the use 
of what he caUs  the  Restricted BayeslHurwicz Criterion for the  resolution of these types of 
games, 
'ln the last two chapters the foUowing testable propositions have been advanced: (1) 
certain information states can be meaningfully identified as ambigllous; (2) in these 
states,  many  othcrwise  reasonable people tend to violate  the  Savage axioms  with 
respect to certain choices; (3) their behavior is  deliberate and  not readily  reversed 
upon reflection; (4) certain patterns of 'violating' behavior can be distinguished and 
described  in  terms  of a specified decision rule;  (5)  this  decision  mIe  is  one which 
has,  in  the  past,  been  recommended  or  suggested  as  appropriate  by  reputable 
theorists; (6) many of  the people concerned recognize the rule as reflecting the sort 
96 Adapted from Ellsberg (2001) 39 
of considerations that influence  their  behavior and  the  rough  character of actual 
mental processes by which they arrive at their decisions.  ,,97 
By saying that there is a wide variety of  problems and thus a large range of possible answers 
for  rational  agents,  Ellsberg  says  that  his  criterion  is  the  only  one  that can  manage  to 
accommodate this large range of eventualities. 
Please keep  in  mind that this critique (the harshest since the publication of The  Theory of 
Games and Economie Behavior in  1944) cornes from a 24 year old who has not even started 
his  doctoral  studies.  Moreover, he  would not  continue ta work  on  game theory  until  his 
. retum from the Marines, three years later. 
It  is  contended  that  the  time  Ellsberg  and  Schelling  spcnt  at  the  RAND  Corporation 
influenced  them  in  applying  there  ideas  to  military  situations.  Thus,  in  order to  better 
understand why Ellsberg and Schelling decided to apply their ideas to conflict situations, the 
following is a short discussion of the atmosphere that RAJ\TJ)  helped create and also a short 
description of the think tank 
9ï Ellsberg (2002), p. 219 CHAPTER III 
THE RAND CORPORATION 
RAND was created in  1946 in order ta provide the US  Army Air Force and its successor the 
US  Air Force, with a  research staff.  In  1944, General Henry Harley (Hap) Arnold wrote a 
letter to Theodore von Karman (a Hungarian refugee), asking him  to  prepare a plan for the 
creation of a militaf): research group in Santa Monica.  Thirteen months later Karman and h.is 
Army Air Force Scientific Advisory Board had created a multivolume report called "Toward 
New  Horizons" which, in fact represented RAND's birth certificate.  RAND's charter reads 
"Project RAND is a continuing program of  scientific study and research on the broad subject 
of air  warfare  with  the  object  of recommending  to  the  Air  Force  preferred  methods, 
techniques  and  instrumentalities  for  this  purpose.,,98  Kaplan's  account  of RAND's 
atmosphere is  very suggestive as regards the influence that the corporation could have had 
on Schelling and Ellsberg, 
"Isolated from the hurly burly of the rest of the world, the men and women (mostly 
men)  of RAND  nurtured  an  esprit  de  corps,  a  sense  of mission,  an  air  of self­
confidence  and  self-importance.  It was,  in  large  measure,  this  atmosphere,  th.is 
intoxication,  that  induced  the  graduai  creation  of a  doctrine  conceming  nuclear 
weapons, nuclear deterrence, nuclear war-fighting; that identified this doctrine with 
RAND, (..  )"9') 
It  was  in  1947  that The  Theory of  Games and Economie Behavior's  co-author, John von 
Neumann, entered RAND as a part-time consultant, continuing to work on military research, 
that had been started in  1937 and which was to last until his death.  It has been argued that 
his presence heavily influenced the research that \Vas  done at RAND in  favor of the Theory 
of  Games (Leonard, 1994).  RAND promoted an interdisciplinary approach to research. As a 
matter of fact,  the  staff consisted of people committed to  natural  (mainly physicists and 
98 Kaplan (1983), p.  59 
99 Ibid, p.  51 41 
engineers) and social sciences.  Herman Kahn is  one of the best examples since he came in 
to RAND as a physicist and left as an economist
lOO 
It is  argued (Leonard,  1991) that the appointment of Charles Hitch as the head of RAND's 
new  Economie Division in  September of 1947, was the  starting point of the emergence of 
economists  within  the  corporation,  "The  affiliates  Hitch  assembled  quickly  made  their 
presence felt among their colleagues (... ) and, by  1960, RAND had become identified with 
systems  analysis,  a  cost-benefit  approach  to  conflict  refined  and  implemented  by 
economists."JOI.  The emergence of economic thought was not unique to RAND, it \Vas  also 
being supported by Bernard Brodie who, in a  1949 article "Strategy as a Science-,  published 
in  World Politics argues that, 'The best hope for elaborating any them-y of strategy, (. .. ),  lay 
(s)  in  exploring its parallels with  'the science of economics', which had  'enjoyed the most 
systematic' and development among social sciences,,102 
It  is  Albert Wohlstetter  who  best  illustrates  the  impact of the  emergence of economists 
within RAND.  Working on the vulnerability of foreign bases to surprise attack. Wohlstetter 
and Harry Rowen had a very important impact on the U.S. Air Force strategy, "(  .. ) the Air 
Force Council concurred with  the  need  for a  strategy shift and concluded that the RAND 
finding, for the most part, should be adopted."I03  Thus, "(.. ) RAND's system analysis (...) 
had caused a signiflcant reorientation in Air Force thinking."I04  Such success paved the way 
for the advent of Robert McNamara and the Whiz Kids which is  considered as the peak of 
the influence of  economic analysis on defense policy. 
Thus it  was the prevailing atmosphere of the 1960's, with the advent of Robert McNamara 
and the Whiz Kids in the Pentagon, the work atmosphere at RAND where Schelling worked 
in  1958  and  Ellsberg  from  1959  to  1964  and  1967  to  the  early  1970's,  as  well  as  a 
100 For further discussion on RAND's atmosphere and influence, one must refer ta Kaplan (1983),
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dissatisfaction  with game theory that  motivated  Ellsberg  and  Schelling  to  create conflict 
theory. 
As  previously mentioned, both Ellsberg and Schelling public/y disavowed the government 
policy in  the early  1970's.  Ellsberg had  first hand experience of the War since he  was in 
Vietnam for three years not as a Marine, but while working at RAND.  On his  retum from 
Vietnam, he  wrote a  series of papers  on what was  happening over therel05  On  the other 
hand,  Schelling  did  not  go  ta  Vietnam;  he  stayed  in  the  US  where  he  had  the  ear  of 
govemment officiais.  It was those same officiais who decided ta use Schelling's ideas on 
coercive warfare in order to intimidate the North-Vietnamese.  His ideas on tacit bargaining 
were also put ta use against the Viet-Cong.  But it was to no avait: one of the reasons being 
that  US  officiais  thought  their  opposites  were  rational  (driven  by  the  utility  level  they 
provide).  It could also be attributed to what Schelling later calls "personification"106  The 
US officiaIs  did  not  stop  and think  that bombs  had no  effect on them.  The  Viet-Cong, 
seeing the destruction cause by  US. bombing, did  not  decide to  lay  down their weapons. 
The Vietnamese  had  successfully  driven  back  foreign  invaders  for  more  then  400  vears. 
They were not about ta let the Americans be the first to succeed. 
ln order to understand why conflict theory had such an influence, one must understand what 
conflict theory consists of.  ln the next sections, there will be a discussion of the origins and 
the concepts that compose conflict theory. 
105 There will be further analvsis of this series. 
106 The impacts ofthis will ~ treated Iater on. CHAPTERIV 
THE THEORY OF CONFLICT: THE CONCEPTS 
In  the  first  chapter  of The  Strategy  of  Conflict,  entitled  'The  Retarded  Science  of 
International  Strategy"  (first published  in  the  Bulletin of the  Atomic Scientist,  December 
1959), which Schelling had presumably written while at RAND in  1958, Schelling says, that 
he is  looking for behaviors during conflict (arrned or not) that would allow the player to be 
viewed as victorious.  "A study of conscious, intelligent, sophlsticated conflict behavior - of 
successful behavior- is  like a  search for  rules  of « correct})  behavior ln a  contest winning 
sense. ,,107  With that in mind Schelling could apply his idèas to a large range of  situations.  It 
could also be contended that he was trying to fmd ways of minimizing the cost and duration 
of conflicts. 
In  the  second  chapter,  "An  Essay  on  Bargaining"  (first  published  in  June  1956  in  The 
American  Economie  Review)  whlch  was  influenced  by  the  time  Schelling  had  spent 
negotiating the Marshall  Plan,  Schelling starts to  dabble with  negotiation.  He  had not yet 
been at RAND, nor presumably had he communicated with Ellsberg, since the latter was in 
the Marine Corps at the time.  Ellsberg does admit that the article had a strong influence on 
his Lowell Lectures.  Nonetheless, it  is white working on this article that the idea of creating 
a new discipline first came to  Schelling's mind.  "An Essay on  Bargaining" is  centered on 
the distribution effects of negotiation where a  better result for one of the parties implies a 
[esser  one  for  the  other,  "This  chapter  presents  a  tactical  approach  to  the  analysis  of 
bargaining"JOS  Each party is  motivated by convictions and the only \-vay to reach a solution 
is  for a concession to  be made by both, or at least one, of the parties.  But why would any 
player behave this way?  The lagic behind the concessions is that it is  better for both parties 
to find a solution.  The difficulty lies  in  knowing wruch of the parties will have to make the 
concession.  The comprehension of  negotiation tactics is very useful in this, 
107  Schelling (1960a), p.  3 
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'The purpose of this chapter is  to cali indeterminate situations.  The essence of these 
tactics is  some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom  of choice.  They rest 
on the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to 
bind oneself,,09 
According  to  Schelling  it  is  very  useful  to  commit  to  something  beforehand.  This 
commitment gives one a greater negotiation power. 
Contrary  to  common  intuition,  power,  force  and  ability are  not  always  an  advantage  in  a 
negotiation.  These qualities are not useful if the other party is  hardheaded and  is  not aware 
of his  own  reputation  or  his  adversary's  reputation.  The  concepts  of commitments  and 
threats  are  central  to  Schelling  and  are  an  integral  part  of Schelling's  conception  of 
negotiation.  Also,  it  is  easier  to  praye something that  is  true  than  something  that  is  not. 
How then,  one can ask,  can one change what  is  real?  Schelling answers:  "make it true"IIO 
A way  of making  something true  is  by  committing to  a position.  One  of the  parties  in  a 
negotiation pledges to  perform sorne  action or threatens to,  a threat being  very similar to a 
commitment since  it  implies  pledging to  inflict pain  in  the  future  Both  commitments and 
threats  are  intended  to  influence  the  party  and  cause  him  to  modify  his  behavior.  To 
illustrate this,  Schelling gives the example of someone who  is  interested  in  buying a house 
that  is  for  sale,  "(  .. ) if the  buyer can accept an  irrevocable commitment,  in  a way  that is 
unambiguously visible to  the seller, he can squeeze the  range of indeterminacy down to the 
point most favorable to  him.,,111  Though, a commitment to a position only has an impact if 
the  commitment  that  is  taken  is  communicated  and  is  plausible.  In  a  world  where 
commitments as weil  as their communication were easy, the advantage would always go to 
the one who coulcl commit the fastest.  One can easily see why the notion of non symmetry 
is  so  important  for  Schelling.  As  was  saicl  earlier,  the  symmetry  ax.iom  in  the  Nash 
bargaining solution did not permit any of the behaviors mentioned above. 
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4.1  Deterrence 
Schelling goes on to the treatment of the question of deterrence which is  described as "(  ... ) 
the  skillful  nonuse  of military  forces  (..  )"  112  and  the  concept of threat  is  central  to  this 
notion.  Deterrence is also very important for the CoId Warriors, since the United States. was 
afraid  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  a  plan  for  world  domination.  To  fully  understand  the 
concept of deterrence one has to be familiar with Schelling's definition ofthreats. 
According to Schelling, there are two kinds of  threats: 
1)  The kind of threat where the two parties have an interest in  applying the threats 
in the advent of attack.  The deterrence potential of these threats is  not very high, 
since it is not their principal function. 
2)  The threats which none of  the parties want to put into application.  The principal 
function ofthese threats is deterrence by promising mu tuai destruction  ln order 
to  render this type of threat credible, a commitment has to be made.  They imply 
that both sides are committed to total destruction if their position has reached a 
point of no  retum.  ln order for  this  strategy to be effective, one must possess 
sufficient credibility in  the eyes of the opposing party.  Practically, this level of 
credibility is often reached by putting one's ovm reputation at stake. This is  very 
frequent  in  negotiations  between  unions and  companies.  This  kind  of threat 
forces the other party to make concessions to avoid mutuai destruction, "When a 
person has lost the power to help himself, or the power to avert mutual damage, 
the  other  interested  party  has  no  choice  but  to  assume  the  cost  of 
responsibility.  ,,113  The  threatened  party,  also  has  options,  it  can  commit  an 
aggression before the threat is  communicated, it can try to share the risk  with a 
third party or it can try to misinform the other party of  its payoffs 
112 Schelling (1 960a), p.  9 
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To maximize the credibility of the threat, it has to be clearly and definitively communicated 
to  the  other party.  Also,  it  is  preferable to  break  up  a serious  threat into  smaller threats, 
"Similar to  decomposing a  threat  into  a  series  is  stating a  threat  with  a punitive  act  that 
grows in severity with the passage of  time."  114 
It  is  not aJways  easy or possible to  verify  if the  other party has  complied with  a demand  in 
order to avoid the posed threat.  Schelling proposes to  include a criterion that does  not have 
to  be  direct!y  linked  to  the  ultimate  goal,  but  the  sole  purpose  of which  would  be  the 
observance  of compliance.  This  was  a  major  problem  during  the  Vietnam  War and  the 
negotiations with  the  Viet-Cong.  Schelling was  stumped to  find  an  adequate answer.  when 
asked  by  the govemment to  find  a criterion that the  Viet-Cong could  respect to  show their 
willingness to negotiate 
4.2  Brinkmanship 
There is  also the  very  important notion of "brinkmanship".  Schelling illustrates this  notion 
as bcing on the edge of a cliff where  the  terrain is  not  very sure.  One cannot exactly know 
where the cliff starts, but the  more  one approaches  the  edge,  the greater the  probability of 
falling down,  "The brink  is  not  in  this  view,  the  sharp edge of a cliff where one  can  stand 
firmly,  look down and decide whether or not to take the plunge"115  This notion relates also 
to  the "Threat that Leaves Something to  Chance" chapter since it  is  not sure when  one will 
"take the  plunge" as  Schelling himself says.  He also brings more precision to  the notion of 
brinkmanship  in  his  1966  Arms  and  Influence  by  saYll1g  that  it  is  similar  to,  "(.) 
manipulating the shared risk ofwar.,,116 
The  notion can best be  illustrated by imagining a situation in  which two climbers are tied to 
one another  If one wants to  intimidate the other, he can seemingly fall  over the cliff, but he 
must  also  use  uncertainty  and  irrationality  for  the  threat  to  be  credible.  "If the  brink  is 
114  Schelling (1960a), p. 42 
115 Ibid, p.  199 
116 Schelling (1966), p.  99 47 
c1early marked and provides a firm footing, no loose pebbles underfoot and no gusts of wind 
to  catch  one  off guard,  (... )  neither  can pose  any  risk  to  the  other by approaching  the 
brink.,,117  As one can see, uncertainty is an important aspect ofbrinkrnanship; one can create 
an air of uncertainty for  a  threat to  be credible.  ScheHing  illustrates how uncertainty can 
contribute to threats; 
"The question is  really:  is  the US. likely to  do something that is  fraught with the 
danger of war,  something that could lead  - through a  compounding of actions and 
reactions,  of  calculation  and  miscalculations,  of  alarms  and  false  aJarms,  of 
commitments and challenges - to a major war?" 
Thus,  uncertainty  and  the  notion  of brinkmanship  facilitate  the  use  of commitment and 
threats by making them appear more credible. 
The notion of threshold can also be associated with brinkmanship.  Going towards the edge 
of the cliff means going through a threshold, such a situation also uses the notion of focal 
points.  Schelling  illustrates  the  notion  of threshold  by  giving the  example of a  chjld  to 
whom a parent says not to go swimming.  The first thing one knows is that the child has both 
feet in the water.  The parent can repeat what he said:  that the child could not go swinuning 
and the child will reply: 'Tm not swimming."  The child will  wade further and  further into 
the lake and finally start swinuning, to the parent's dismay who will tell himself: "The child 
does  not obey".  What really happened is  that the  child by  going into the water crossed a 
threshold.  From  that  point  on,  it  was  difficult  to  stop  the  chiId  from  going swimming. 
Similar behavior can be extended to nations in conflict. 
Another  concept  that  the  Theory  of Confliet  wishes  to  formalize  IS  the  use  of threats; 
Ellsberg, not Schelling, worked on that part of  conflict theory 
)l, Schelling (1966), p.  99 48 
4.3  The Theory of Conflict and the Practice of Blackmail 
After spending sorne time  in  the economics department at RAND (Schelling was also  there 
at the time),  Ellsberg gave  his  1958  Lowell  Lectures.  What he  was  trying to  do  was  to 
formalize  the  use  of blackmail.  His  formalization  derives  primarily  from  economic 
bargaining  and  also,  by  his  own  admission,  from  Schelling's "An  Essay  in  Bargaining" 
which was very stimulating in this treatment of blackmail.  Ellsberg is  interested in  the use 
ofthreats because, "(...) threats and ultimatums can lead to peaceful 'solutions' (  .. ),,118  In 
effect, according to Ellsberg, threats can be used as a peacetime tool of diplomacy.  Ellsberg 
also points out that a threat only has an  influence on "rational behavior", since the subject" s 
behavior is  controlled by rus  expectations of outcomes and by his  preferences.  He  is  also 
quick to point out that, "A good deal of'insahe' behavior, in other words, might be 'rational' 
in this technical sense, ( . ),,119  This formalization will look to answer sorne basic questions 
such as 
l20 
. 
What data is  relevant to a 'blackmailer's' decisions? 
How are threats measured and represented? 
How do threats influence decision making? 
Firstly, conceming the relevant data, this refers to the knowledge of  the level or likelihood of 
a threat that is given by the subject.  That is, how likell' it is,  in the subject's opinion, that, a 
threat will be put in application.  To be effective, a threat does not need to be a certaintl' but 
simply,  "sufficiently  likely"121.  A  way  to  measure this  level  of likelihood,  according to 
Ellsberg,  IS  the  odds  that  players give to gambles  on  the  likelihood of certain situations. 
Concretely, what the blackmailer must do is:  "(  ... ) to ensure - by actions that either change 
l'our payoffs, hence l'our critical risk, or that increase your expectation of punishment - sa 
that your estimate of the actual risk  is  greater then  the critical  risk.,,122  For convenience 
118 Ellsberg (1959) 
119 Ibid 
120  Ibid 
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sake,  Ellsberg  assumes  that "( ... ) a player's state of uncertainty,  his  expectations,  can  be 
represented  by  a  distribution  of 'subjective  probabilities,,,123  Realistically,  one  would 
evaluate the critical risk,  or the threshold, as low,  if the victim does not need to be very sure 
to  do  what  the  blackmailer  requires.  On  the  other  hand  if the  threshold  is  high,  the 
blackmailer must make the threat as probable as possible.  The blackmailer will also want to 
influence the victim's estimates ofhis payoffs. 
Secondly, Ellsberg represents threats in matrix form such as: 
Victim 
Comply  Resist 
Blackmailer 
Accept  (100,  10)  (50,  100) 
Punish  (0,  0) 
Figure 5:  Ellsberg's representation ofthreats 
The numbers to the right being the victim's payoff, the numbers to the  left the blackmailer's 
payoff  Contrary to  Luce and  Raiffa,  there  is  no  basis for  comparmg the  victim 's and  the 
blackmailer's payoffs  and  that  is  why there  is  no  payoff for  the combination of the  Punish 
and Comply strategies. 
The  concept of probability of threats  must  not  be  confused  with  Schelling's idea of "The 
Threat that  Leaves Something to  Chance" since what Schelling develops in  that chapter of 
The Strategy oJConjlict is  the  notion that the  threat is  not completely under the threatener's 
control.  There  is  a random  ingredient to  the application of the  threat.  Schelling 's goal  in 
that chapter was simply to state that an effective way of coercing someone was to  include a 
random  ingredient,  whereas  Ellsberg's  goal  is  completely  different  since  he  \vishes  to 
formalize the systematic use of blackmail for coercion. 
Thirdly, the available data influences  the  behavior of the  subjects in  many  ways  Since the 
payoffs seem to have an influence on the victim 's behavior, the higher the payoff associated 
with  "Resist"  behavior,  the  more  credible  the  threat  has  to  be.  Ellsberg  cornes  to  this 
123 Ellsberg (1959) 50 
conclusion with the analysis of a bank robbery where a man simply passes a typed note to a 
tel1er saying that he has two grenades and that the tel!er should put 5000$ in a coin bag.  The 
tel1er  does  as  he  is  told since he  considers the threat likely  enough.  However,  when the 
robber sees that there is much more money in the drawer, he asks for the rest of it.  The tcller 
simply tells  mm  that  5000$  was  al!  he  had  asked for and  refuses  to give the  robber the 
remaining money.  Thus the teller considers the threat as credible enough when 5000$ is  at 
stake but not credible enough when a lot more is  at stake.  This contradicts Savage's fourth 
postulate, which states that there is  independence between the probabilities and the payoffs. 
According  to  the  Savage  Axioms  the teller's  reaction  should  not  have  changed  with the 
amount that was asked for 
According to Ellsberg, there are four threat techniques that could, "( ... ) make it sufficiently 
plausible that he  will carry out a costly threatened action."124  Two of these techmques are 
similar to Schelling's, such as the commitment where, "(  .. ) the blackmailer can voluntarily 
but  irreversibly  give up  his  freedom  of choice,,12S:  the other is  where,  'The player binds 
himself to incur certain costs or penalties or to forego certain advantages if he should fail  to 
carry  out  a  pledge. ,,126  El!sberg  then  points  out  that  Schelling  does  not  make  a  clear 
distinction between the two types of threats.  These two types have drawbacks since, "( ... ) 
(who) would really bind himself irrevocably to carry out a suicidai punishrnent?,,127 (that is 
the hardest critique Ellsberg addresses to Schelling).  According to Ellsberg, these threats are 
not optimal from the threatener's point of view and it  is  with this in  mind that he  proposes 
the  other  two  techniques;  one  can  make  his  actions  unpredictable  and/or  make  himself 
appear irrational.  There will  be  a  subsequent discussion  of these  techniques  in  the next 
sections. 
What this analysis brought to conflict theory is easily seen since one of  the ways of making a 
situation tum in one's favor is  by  using threats.  Also Schelling explicitly said that conflict 
theory implied the use ofthreats. 
124 Ellsberg (1959) 
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4.4  The Theory of Confliet and Politieal use of Madness
128 
It is  interesting to note that Ellsberg refers to the use of madness - that is irrational behavior ­
simply to confuse the opponent in his  1956 article:  "Creating doubts by deliberately erratic 
or  'foolish'  choices,  one  could  tempt  the  opponent  to  pursue  (for  sound,  profit-seeking 
motives)  into  the  regions  where  big  killings  were  possible.,,129  Less  then  3  years  later, 
Ellsberg would give his crucial (at least in  Schelling's eyes) lectures on the Art of Coercion 
at the Lowell Institute.  In one of these lectures he tried to show that Hitler deliberately made 
sure  that  his  enemies (or adversaries)  knew and  were sure that there was  not a  threat  he 
would not put to execution.  Hitler wanted to be assured that his adversaries thought he  \-vas 
unpredictable. 
At one point, Ellsberg analyzes the invasion of Czechoslovakia.  What Hitler did was to put 
the  fate  of the  Czechoslovakians in the hands  of their President,  Dr Emil  Hàcha.  Hitler 
requested a  personal audience with  President Hàcha
'30 
-- keep in  mind  that  the  Anchluss 
with Austna had already been carried out.  At this point, Hitler said that it was up to Hàcha 
and  his  Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, to decide if there would  be  blood spilled over this 
matter.  Hitler said that the invasion of  what was left of Czechoslovakia by the German army 
was set in  less than 5 hours. He also let the two gentlemen know that the orders had already 
been given and that if Hàcha decided to give the order to  resist the  invasion, the German 
army was ready to  fight and would prevail  131.  Therefore, since there was no way of  stopping 
the  invasion,  it  would  be  better  that  Hàcha give  the  order  not  to  resist.  That  way,  the 
invasion would be imposed without bloodshed. 
128 My treatment of this partieutar point is highly inadequate; Ùle  reason being tllat aecess ta
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131  This is also seen as highly optirnistie on Hitler's part, aceord.ing to some h..istorians (Shirer (1960)).
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Thetruth was that Hitler could ill afford to have an anned resistance to his Czechoslovakian 
invasion since the resistance would act as an alarrn bell or as  a  plate-glass  window
132  and 
alert England and France to what he was doing. 
What Ellsberg  is  trying to  do,  and the  reason  why  Schelling  refers  to  his  lectures,  is  to 
illustrate the use of commitments and deterrence by Hitler in  negotiations.  The  fact  that 
Hitler told Hàcha that the  invasion orders had  been given is  equivalent to  making a  final 
offer and  leaving the  room.  As  Schelling says,  one has  to  make  "(... )  the  other player 
choose in  his  favor,,'33  AIso,  the threat will cause losses to both sides, though the  losses 
would not be symmetrical. What is more, as we have seen before, the deterrence potential of 
this kind of  threat is high. 
Hovi economists came to  have such an influence on  V.S.  miiitary decision making can be 
explained, in  part, by RAND's influence (which has  been discussed in  Chapter 3).  It can 
also be  explained  by  the  presence of the Whiz  Kids  in  the  Pentagon.  Though,  \vhy the 
Theory of Conflict ideas had such influence cannot solely be explained by what has  been 
said.  The following is an explanation of how the Theory of Conflict came to have such an 
influence during the 1960's and how this influence was felt. 
132 Schelling also uses the plate-glass window analogy.  The breaking of a plate-glass \vindow is 
hardly a discrete affair and would surely attract wlwanted attention.  He aJso sees the plate-glass 
window as a trip wire. 
133 Schelling (1960). p.276 CHAPTERV 
THE THEORY OF CONFLICT AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
How Schelling's ideas received so much attention may be explained this way  during his stay 
at Harvard,  Schelling met  John  McNaughton.  Within a  short period  of time  McNaughton 
became Schelling's protégé.  An  important  mtellectual  bond  was created between the two 
men. 
"(one) of the  Pentagon's brightest theorists and  mast  skillful  bureaucratie players, 
happened to  be  one of Tom  Schelling's most  dedicated  devotees,  a  Harvard  Law 
School professor named John McNaughton.  ,,134 
It  is  because of McNaughton and the publication of The  Strategy of  ConJlicl, that Schelling 
won  McNamara's ear.  This allo\ved  conflict  theor-y  to  have an  influence on  US foreign 
policy early in the 1960's  How McNaughton got to be  McNamara's assistant was in part 
because  of Schelling  ln effect,  McNamara  was  looking  for  a  special  assistant  on  anns 
control.  McNamara  had  offered  the  job  ta  Schelling,  who  refused  but  recommended 
McNaughton.  The latter, after leaming that his  mentor had  recommended him, went ta see 
Schelling, telling him that he was interested in the job, but did not know the first thing about 
anns control.  Schelling told him not to worry; he would show him everything there was to 
knOW  about the  subject.  McNaughton later became General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense 
l35 
An example ofSchelling's influence over McNaughton can be seen in a speech that the latter 
gave in  1962: 
"The open declaration of a city-avoidance option (as  compared with a  mere secret 
preparation  for  city  avoidance)  is,  in  a  sense,  a  notice  served.  lt is  a  notice  in 
accordance with  which an enemy may weil  expect the  United  States to  behave  in 
case war is forced upon us.  (... )  If it  (the enemy) values the lives of its citizens, it 
134 Kaplan (1983), p.  332 
135 Ibid, p.  332 54 
should take steps  to  create  for  itself a  targeting  option  to  spare  the  cities  of its 
enemies."J36 
Notice  the  influence  of Schelling,  especially  in  tacit  bargaining  and  making the  enemy 
behave  in  a  way that is  non-threatening.  These two characteristics are very  important to 
Schelling and  central  to conflict theory.  This is  achieved by the open declaration of city­
avoidance and by adding emphasis on the fact that the enemy will do the same if it "values 
the  lives  of its  citizens".  This  is  known as  the  "no-cities strategy".  There will  later be 
treatment ofthe subject. 
The modus operandithat was in place at the end ofthe 1950's for the use ofnuclear weapons 
was Eisenhower's.  lt preached full out attack, or "ail or nothing"  as it became to be known. 
Eisenhower believed that the US. could win a  nuclear war against the communists, so  he 
preached that in the event of a hostile act by the Soviets, the US. response should be an ail 
out nuclear attack.  McNamara
137  for his part, also believed in the US.'s chances ofwinning 
a nuclear confliet, but he did not see the point of winning if the win came at the cost of a  100 
million  lives  and 30  years of economic depression.  He was  not  satisfied  either with the 
flexibility that would be  allowed by the Eisenhower strategy,  or the  lack thereof.  At that 
time McNamara, Kissinger and Schelling were ail  looking for a modus operandi that allowed 
J38 for  more flexibility, one that would  not automatically lead  to  a  nuclear war.  Kissinger
thought it  possible to win a  limited nuclear war with the Soviet Union;  but couId  the U.S. 
realistically foresee a strategy that would result in 25  million lives  instead of 50 or 100 and 
10 years instead of 30 years of  economic depression? 
8
th tn  the  chapter  of The  Strategy  of Conf/ict  "The  Threat  that  Leaves  Something  to 
Chance ", Schelling puts  forth  the argument that sets  him apart from  Kissinger and others. 
This argument heavily influenced McNamara and his associates.  This influence can be seen 
136 John T. McNaughton, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, address to We International 
Arms Control Symposium, December 1962 in Schelling (1966) 
137 One can referto the Errol Moris's film, The Fog ofWar, to have a better idea of McNamara's 
ùlOughts on nuclear warfare. 
138  See Kissinger (j  969), but he had been trying to influence US foreign policy since we early 
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in a  speech  McNamara gave in  June of 1962.  The  Secretary of Defense  laid  out a  new 
defense strategy that was  said to be flexible.  McNamara was kno\-vn  for his preference for 
strategies with "multiple-solutions" (this could maybe be explained by the fact that he  was 
an economist).  This new strategy, which is  now known as the "counterforce strategy" and 
the "no-eities strategy", is  in  fact two distinct strategies (this  is  a  source of ambiguity that 
troubled  Schelling).  McNamara's strategy puts forth  the  idea that,  in  the  event of a  war 
between the two super-powers, destruction would not  be  total.  Deterrence should continue 
and the parties should always keep their options open.  In effect, the parties must be able to 
put an end to the hostilities  before the respective  arms  stockpiles  are reduced to  nothing. 
Hence the importance of arms control  It was innovative since it  put forth the idea of using 
deterrence during a conflict.  Former policies  used deterrence but always before a conflict 
started,  in  order  to  minimize  the  probability  of a  conflict.  McNamara  wanted  to  use 
deterrence and tacit bargaining in order to put an end to a conflicl. 
Counterforce is the first of the two elements that composed the new McNamara strategy, and 
is  the  one  that attracted the most attention.  It  suggested  that the  primary targets  be  the 
weapons the adversary is  capable of using when at'a.acking.  Given that he can no longer use 
these  weapons  to  defend  himself or  to  attack,  the  adversary 'will  have  no  choice  but  to 
surrender.  This train of thought can  be  associated with  H.  Kahn who first  exposed these 
ideas in his book, On Thermonuclear War.  The other side of McNamara's strategy is  better 
known  as  the  "no-cities  strategy".  It  put  forth  the  idea  of taking  the  enemy  cities  as 
hostages.  This strategy relies on tacit bargaining and deterrence.  The aim is to communicate 
to the other party that one is able to completely destroy the other party's territory or at least a 
big part of il.  Schelling's influence  is  felt  in  the  rcserve force,  as weil as in  the  idea of 
finding  ways out  of a  conflict (before  entering one),  both  of which  were  components  of 
McNamara's strategy. 
In 1965
139
,  Schelling published "Controlled Response and Strategic Warfarc" in the Ade/phi 
Papers.  In  this  article,  Schelling wishes  to  distance  himself from  McNamara's strategy, 
139 One can only conjecture as to the reasons why il took so long for Schelling to reac!. 56 
since, in  Schel!ing's opinion, counterforce and no-cities seem, at first glance, to be mutually 
exclusive but are not quite that and can create unneeded confusion. 
Firstly,  Schelling  says  that  none  of these strategies  can  be  applied  if the  parties  are  not 
rational.  Here and  in  many  other published  works,  Schelling  feels  the  need  to  support 
rationality.  Schelling does  not  seriously  tackle  the  issue;  he  simply brushes  it  aside  by 
simply stating the obvious.  He does not explain why, or how, one of the parties (or both) 
could act in a manner that could be qualified as irrational.  This is  also strange since one can 
assume that Schelling knew about Herbert Simon's work on bounded rationality, especially 
since Simon's  1955  "A Behavioral  Model of Rational  Choice" article  is  one of the most 
cited works by game theorists  working on or with  ratIOnality.  One can also assume that 
Schelling was familiar with Simon's article since it  was written (at least the first draft) at 
RAND.  Simon's goal in his  1955 article is; 
"(... ) to replace the global rationality of the economic man with a  kind  of rational 
behavior that  is  compatible  with  the  access  to  information and the  computational 
capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man,  in  the kinds of 
environments in which such organism exits."I40, 
Simon pays close attention to the limit a "choosing organism" can process in  order to take a 
"rational" decision.  As Simon says; 
"(..  )  actual  human  rationality-striving  can  at  best  be  an  extremely  crude  and 
simplified  approximation  to  the  kind  of global  rationality  that  is  implied,  for 
example, by game-theoretical models.,,141 
One can refer to E.-M. Sent's work for further information on Herbert Simon.  A reason that 
might explain why  Schelling does not refer to Simon's work could be tha1,  even if Simon 
\Vas  very enthusiastic towards game theory in  1945, he became more and more dissatisfied 
with  it as time wen! on.  !n  1958, Simon was quite  dissatisfied with game theory notably 
with the "( ... ) achievement of a really satisfactory definition of 'solution' for non-zero-sum 
140 Simon (1955) 
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and  n-person games seems  even farther off now  than  it  did  a  decade ago ... ,,142.  He also 
"( ... ) criticized von Neumann and Morgenstern 's theory ofcoalitions, faulted their definition 
of good strategy, and questioned their solution concept.  ,,143  Schelling never really fonnally 
criticized von Neumann and Morgenstern.  He had, as has already been said,  voiced criticism 
of the Nash solution, though this does not explain why he felt the need to support rationality. 
Later in  rus  life,  Schelling puts this  problem aside by  saying that one should anticipate his 
own  irrational  actions,  a  rational  decision  (or  action)  being  a  decision  (or  action)  that 
maximizes (or at least increases) one utility level.  He illustrates this by giving the example 
of an  ex-smoker who has just quit smoking.  A friend  comes over to  have a cup of coffee 
and, when leaving, forgets  his  cigarettes.  The ex-smoker puts his  friend's cigarettes  in  his 
pocket, thinking he  will give them back to his friend the following day;  15  minutes later th,e 
ex-smoker flushes  the cigarettes  down a  toilet.  "What provoked  this  irrational  action?" 
Schelling then asks.  His answer is  that, the ex-smoker understood that he  had just passed a 
threshold  that  could  lead  to  him  having  a  cigarette.  He  anticipated  his  own  irrational 
action144  Schelling also cornes to the conclusion that the rational choice model is  at best a 
verysimplified way of  explaining and predicting actual human behavior. 
Secondly, the problem with McNamara's strategy, according to Schelling, is that it is  in  fact 
two strategies.  The counterforce strategy states that one must destroy the enemy's weapons 
before  they  are  used.  The  problem  with  trus  strategy,  Schelling  says,  is  the  state  of 
confusion it creates, "The counterforce campalgn would be noisy, likely to disrupt the enemy 
command structure,  and  somewhat ambiguous in  its  target selection as  far  as the  enemy 
could see. ,,145  One can see why the general mood created by the counterforce is not wanted 
in  time of conflict,  whereas, the other side of McNamara's strategy, the no-cities strategy 
states that the U.S.  must create a situation \vhere the enemy should not attack, even if it has 
the  capacity of doing so.  It also  has the  merit  of being seen  as  a  way to  minimize  the 
probability of there being a conflict, "It can also, with no loss of manliness, be recognized as 
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a decent effort to  keep from  killing tens of millions of people whose guilt,  if any,  is  hardly 
commensurate with their obliteration.,,146  This strategy takes the form of a negotiation (with 
tacit-bargaining).  If nuclear conflict there is, then great loss of life there will be and nobody 
will be able to claim victory, "( ... ) historians would not much care whether the Soviet cities 
were destroyed by weapons produced domestically or abroad. ,,147 
Schelling also states that the evaluation of these strategies should be donc on the  basis of 
technology,  costs,  and  paying  capacity,  as  did  McNamara
J48  and  as  was  dictated  by 
operational research.  There can be  several  situations where the use  of one strategy or the 
other (counterforce and no-cities) can have very different impacts.  Schelling did not want ta 
say  \.vhich  of the  strategies  should  be  used  (even  though,  after  reading  the  article  and 
knowing his background, one can easily know which strategy Schelling is  in favor of) but to 
distinguish the two strategies.  Given that one of the strategies uses notions that he put forth 
and  used many  times,  he  felt  compeIJed  to  clarify  the  difference  between  the  two.  The 
counterforce strategy requires speed from an adversary and can create unwanted confusion 
and chaos.  These two characteristics are ta be minimized at ail costs.  The type of weapons 
that the parties must favor in counterforce can contribute ta unstable situations.  If one of the 
parties  favors  counterforce,  it will  equip  its  armed  forces  in  a  way  that  will  permit it to 
destroy the other party's weapons.  The other party seeing this wiJl have a greater chance of 
striking first.  If the emphasis is  given to counterforce, there will  bc  a greater chance of a 
preemptive strike, since the advantage given to the party that strikes  first  is  great, thus the 
unstable situation. 
The no-cities  strategy on  the other hand puts the  emphasis on \vhat  could be called dirty 
weapons (contrary to counterforce, which puts the emphasis on clean weapons) that have the 
capacity of causing a great number of casualties.  This strategy, as contradictory as  it ma)' 
sound, is more stable (refer to Wohlstetter's image ofa Balance of  Terror).  This stability is 
produced by the fact that neither of the parties wants to  initiate a conflict.  This information 
is  known to  both parties (common  knowledge); also  k..'1own  is  that they  both have second 
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strike capacity.  Both are aware of the living conditions that would prevail in  their country 
after a nuclear war.  As Schelling says; "Maybe one of the reasons why therrno-nuclear \:var 
has  been  likened to 'mutual suicide'  is  that suicide is  often an attractive escapist solution 
compared with having to go on living. ,,149 
In  a  general  manner,  Schelling  says  that  the  US.  nuclear  strategy  must  be  one  of 
intimidation; the  US. must use its  nuclear weapons in  order to  intimidate and  threaten the 
Soviet Union.  It  is  essential to give the impression that in  the event of total war, the US. 
would have the capacity to survive.  For Schelling, it  is  better to  use the threat of a reserve 
force than to use the Eisenhower doctrine of all-or-nothing.  Since threatening to launch an 
ali-out nuclear attack in the advent of any kind of misconduct by the Soviets did  not allow 
much  flexibility.  Also,  the  use  of the  no-cities  strategy  is  bettcr  than  the  Kissingcr 
l50 
doctrine  of using  nuclcar  weapons  in  limitcd  conflicts  since  it  could  also  be  used  in 
conventional warfare. 
Thc credibility ofa nuclear threat, according to Schelling, depends on the ability of  one party 
to  convince  the  other  that  an  aggression  on the  latter's part  will  automatically  provoke 
massive retaliation.  Schelling wants to profit from the fact that t....~e  superpowers are terrified 
of the  threat  of nuclear war.  He  suggests  the  idea  that  the  U.S.  use  this  fear  to  their 
advantage  Thus it would be the Soviets who would have to retreat, or face the consequences 
of causing a nuclear holocaust  The Soviets, or any communist country, must believe that 
bad  judgment  on  their  part  would  provoke an  inevitable  retaliatory  action  by  the  US. 
leading, perhaps, to a holocaus1.  This threat has the advantage of being more credible than 
what  the  Eisenhower  strategy  had  to  offer,  that  is  conciliation  or  nuclear  war.  To  be 
credible, a  nuclear policy, according to  Schelling,  has  to communicate the message that a 
nuclear conflict is  inevitable even if the U.S.  does not want i1.  This idea \Vas  first developed 
in the 8
th  chapter of The Strategy ofConflict "The Threat that Leaves Something to Chance". 
It  is  also  what  Peter  George  in  print  (Red  Alert)  and  Stan!ey  Kubrick  in  film  (Dr. 
Strangelove) used.  Schelling even uses the little black box analogy to show that the nuclear 
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warheads would not be controlled by humans in case of  an attack.  He also uscs the concept 
of deterrence  since  the  aggressor  must  think  about  the  consequences  of committing  an 
aggresSlOn. 
By provoking a crisis or a local  conflict, the aggressor would be playing a  very dangerous 
game, since by doing so  he forces the other party to react and creates a situation that could 
provoke a  holocaust.  The U.S.  should cultivate this  fear and could find  it advantageous to 
demonstrate that even a small  scale aggression could  provoke an  incontrollable snow-ball 
effect that could result in nuclear war.  The Eisenhower strategy could hardily be seen as soft 
but on the other hand it could not demonstrate what it preached without provoking an ali-out 
war.  Schelling's strategy,  at least  he contends,  could achieve  such  a goal.  One way of 
demonstrating this is  by using new kinds of annaments in  the early stages of a conflict 
l51  in 
enemy territory.  The primary goal of  doing so is  not ta gain military advantage (in the same 
way a strategie bombing campaign would) but ta simply show the enemy that one has these 
weapons and would not hesitate ta use them 
l52  Neither of  the parties wants this and the only 
\Vay ofavoiding it, is for the eoemy to retreat.  This \Vay the enemy cannot only save his own 
life but humanity's as weil (in tht case of nuclear weapons). 
In the following section, we will see how Schelling uses the Korean conflict to illustrate how 
confliet theory can have an impact on  the military decision of  a country and also, its foreign 
policy. 
5.1  The Theory of Confliet and the Korean War 
It  is  helpful  ta  look  at the  way Schelling  analyzed  the  Korean  War.  He  makes  several 
references  to  it  in  his  1966  book Arms and J;~fluence.  Schelling's point of view  on  the 
Korean conflict is  pri.:nariiy historical. 
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Here is  a short overview of what happened  in  Korea at the mid-point of the 20
th  century. 
After the Second World War, it was decided that Korea would be divided in two, since it had 
been a Japanese colony since 1910.  North of the 38
th  parallel would be occupied by Soviet 
Russia, the south would be under the control of the United States military  General Douglas 
MacArthur would control the area from his headquarters in Tokyo. 
ln the North,  the  Soviets  and  Kim  Il-Sung  created  the  North  Korean  People's  Army, 
equipped  with  Russian  tanks  and  artillery.  In  the  South,  the  chaotic  political  situation 
resulted  in  an  American-backed  administration  under  the  presidency  of Syngman  Rhee, 
whose  openl)'  declared  aim  was  the  imposition  of national  unity  by  force.  As  a  result, 
because the Americans did  not want to encourage Rhee,  the South Korean Army (who was 
trained by the US.) was small in numbers and had limited equipment. 
After several years of bloody frontier  incidents,  the Republic of Korea was invaded  by the 
North  Korean  People's Army on  June 25  1950.  Despite earlier indications,  the Pentagon 
was caught off-guard.  The tirst American troops were sent in  to  help contain the invasion. 
However, the North Koreans still advanced  rapidly south, aiming to take the  vital  port of 
Pusan.  The American troops were hurriedly sent from  occupation duties  in  Japan,  faring 
badIy against superior North Korean troops, but still managing to prevent the North Koreans 
from taking the port. 
It  was  not  before  November  of that  year,  that  China  decided  to  intervene.  General 
MacArthur ordered a pursuit which led  troops deep into North Korea.  As  the UN. troops 
drew near the Manchurian border, there were ominous signais from  Peking that communist 
China would intervene to defend its territory.  With the Chinese intervention, the U.N. troops 
were forced to retreat and by early January  1951  the)' were defending a ime south of Seou!. 
Three months later and for the remaining two years, fighting stabilized. 
ln mid-1951, with the land battle in  a stalemate, both sides agreed to go to the conference 
table and armistice talks began.  They dragged on for two years; in July 1953 an entente was 
reached. 62 
The conflict was over before Schelling had seriously started to  think about conflict theor.y. 
He  does  analyze  the  conflict  in  his  1966  Arms  and Influence.  Schelling  discusses  the 
Chinese  intervention;  he  does  not  analyze the  reasons  why the  US. decided to  intervene 
against North Korea.  First of ail, Schelling sees the Korean conflict as the perfect example 
of a  Iimited conflict.  The adversaries, in this case the  United Nations (primarily the US.), 
the South Koreans and subsequently the Chinese never decided to use coercive warfare, nor 
did  they threaten to use the others cities as hostages.  It was essentially a soldier's war; the 
fighting was Iimited to the battlefields.  This can also be  seen in  the nature of the weapons 
both  sides decided to  use.  These weapons were conventional weapons:  neither decided  to 
use  nuclear weapons  or chemical  weapons,  which can be  used  to  take a  large  number of 
people hostage.  The V.S  did not bomb across the Yalu, Schelling gives a lot of importance 
to  the  Yalu  River;  "The Yalu  was  like  the  Rubicon.  To  cross  it  would  have  signaled 
something.  It is  a natural place to stop; crossing it would have been new strategy."IS3  The 
Yalu  River  is  seen  as  a  focal  point,  it  \Vas  a  threshold  that the  U.S.  could  not  afford  to 
154  cross  . 
The  reasons  that  lead  to  the  conflict,  according  to  Schelling,  can  be  attributed  to 
miscommunication.  The US.S.R. did  not understand the importance of South Korea for the 
US.  This importance can primarily be explained by the Truman doctrine.  It stated that the 
communists wanted to  literally  take  over the  world.  Consequently to  let  the communists 
have more influence would start something that could not be controlled.  Another result of 
miscommunication meant that the US. did not understand the messages China was sending, 
trying  to  signal  the  importance it  attributed  to  North Korea.  This  error cannot easily  be 
understood since the  US. did  not hesitate to  defend an  aUy  that was  half way around the 
world; how could the)' thinl<. that China would not try to defend lis neighbor and ally?  But as 
we will see later there are sorne possible answers to this question. 
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The conflict can also be explained by the fact that the  U.S.  did  not want to  lose face.  For 
Schelling the  image the leaders  of a  country  want to  project  is  one of the  most  valuable 
assets in  its  foreign  policy;  "We lost thirty  thousand  dead  in  Korea  to  save  face  for  the 
United States and the  United Nations, not to save South Korea for the South Koreans, and it 
was undoubtedly worth it."I55 
Two years after the  publication of Arms and Influence  in  which the preceding analysis was 
exposed,  Schelling  gave  a  lecture  that would  drastically  depart from  his  prior work.  In 
September of 1968, he began to distance himself from the ideas he had been expressing for 
the past decade.  Ellsberg, for his part, first started publishing the doubts he  had about US 
foreign  policy and namely the U.S  strategy in Vietnam; in June of 1969.  The next chapter 
will  examine  the  reasons  the  authors  give  to  explain  why  they  were  trying  to  distance 
themselves from conflict theory 
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SCHELLING AND ELLSBERG TRY TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES 
FROM CONFLICT THEORY 
An  event that influenced Schelling's change of mind was what happened in  Czechoslovakia 
in  1968, which became known as the Prague Spring  It also forced  Schelling to change his 
views about a Soviet intervention in  Czechoslovakia since he  had said, by  his  own account, 
many times, that the type of intervention the Soviets did, would not have been possible  It 
also forced him to reconsider many of his  ideas, as the following discussion will show.  But 
first, here is a brief overview of what happened in Czechoslovakia in  1968. 
6.1  Prague Spring 1968, an overview 
One result of the end of World War 1 was the break up of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire 
into different independent states; the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic was one result.  In 
1935, Tomas Masaryk, the first president, retired.  He left the post to his long-time colleague 
Edvard Benes.  During Benes' time as president, he  tried to  implement democracy, but he 
had to face many problems, and the most difficult one was the  rise of Nazism in Germany. 
One of Hitler's main aims was to destroy the Treaty of Versailles and to unite ail Germans 
living in  other countries.  As  we have seen, Ellsberg used Hitler's actions as an example in 
his work. 
Hitler demanded the  incorporation of a  part of Czechoslovakia, named Sudetenland.  His 
request was granted  in  the  Munich  Agreement by the  Western powers,  with  the  hope of 
appeasing him, sinced they  believed  it  to be his  Iast territorial claim in Europe.  In March 
1939,  however,  Hitler  and  Germany  occupied  most  of the  rest  of Czechoslovakia.  The 
importance of the  Czech crisis as a background to World War II cannot be underestimated. 65 
Stalin feared a German attack and signed a non-aggression pact with Germany.  The German 
occupation lasted until Czechoslovakia was liberated by  Soviet and American forces  at the 
end ofWorid War II. 
The communists obtained political power through free  elections and, step by step, between 
1945  and  1948, Czechoslovakia became a Soviet satellite.  The main reason for the Czechs 
to  support communism was that they could not forget  that parts of their country had  been 
handed over to  Nazi Germany,  by  the Westem powers.  Czechoslovakia was now the last 
outpost against the West.  This should be kept in  mind since Schelling suggested that, since 
Czechoslovakia  was  at the  edge  of the  Soviet  bloc,  NATO  could  perhaps  use  it  to  its 
advantage 
On  January 5
th  1968, the Siovak Alexander Dubcek, who was opposed to the hard-liners led 
by the current president, managed to win the support of a majority of  the Central Committee. 
Within a short amount of time Dubcek started to loosen the  repressive political ropes of the 
former regime  A wind of democratization started to blow throughout Czechoslovakia; this 
is  what came to  be  known as the  Prague Spring.  At a  conference in the city of Brno, on 
16
th March  1968,  Dubcek  promised  a  \vide  democratization  for  the  country  and  greater 
autonomy for the govemment, the courts, the trade unions and economic enterprises. 
In April of the sarne year the Czech Communist Party published its "Action Program".  This 
Action Program deeply concemed the other member-states of the Warsaw Pact.  They tried 
to  force  Dubcek  to  take the reform  prograrn  back,  but he  refused.  After a  Warsaw Pact 
meeting where Czechoslovakia was not invited, the Warsaw Pact leaders sent a letter of their 
conclusions, stating that they found the Czechoslovak policy totally unacceptable.  Dubcek's 
answer \Vas  that his  new policy would continue.  It  was declared  on the nnd of July  1968 
that the Warsaw Pact countries would march into Prague to  prevent a counterrevolution.  It 
was  not  before  the  end  of August  of that  year  that  the  Eastern  Bloc  countries,  except 
Romania,  invaded  Czechoslovakia with  over 200 000  foreign  soldiers on  Czechoslovakia 
soil, the leaders of Czechoslovakia were forced to pledge allegiance to communism. 66 
Czechoslovakia represented too much of a threat to communism and the Warsaw Pact.  If it 
was  allowed to break free,  there  was  a  risk that other satellites could follow and that the 
Soviet  Union  would  lose  their  defensive  "moat"  of  countries,  such  as  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia  and  East Germany.  Furthermore,  if the  Czechs  decided  to  join a  pro­
western policy, it would have posed an important security-policy threat to the Soviet Union. 
The Western countries had the possibility of placing tactical and strategic nuclear weapons 
in Eastern Czechoslovakia.  It could have totally tilted the balance of power. 
The events that have just been presented, as was said before, forced Schelling to reconsider 
some of his  positions.  He did  so  in  a  conference given on  September 21 st  1968  for the 
mstitute for Strategie Studies, where he exposes in public for the tirst time a real change in 
his line ofthinking. 
Schelling says that he  never would have imagined, or predicted, what happened in  Prague 
just a month before he gave his talk: "1  have to confess that within the last 6 months 1 have 
predicted in  public, not once but several times, that the Russians would not do the kind of 
tlling  that  in  August  they  did.,,156  One  of the  reasons  why  Schelling  would  not  have 
predicted an armed intervention by the Russians is that, in his  1966 Arms and Influence, and 
also  in  articles  up  to  that  date,  he  develops  the  idea that sorne  countries  lay  outside the 
immediate  sphere of influence  of either the  U.S.  or the  U.S.S.R.  In  a  subsection  titled 
Discrediting an Adversary's Commitments of the second chapter of the  1966  book, The Art 
of Commitment, Schelling explains that one should show one's adversary that he should not 
react the same \Vay to an enemy intrusion or attack on a satellite country or territory as on a 
direct territory.  Schelling gives L~is  example: the US  would react differently to an attack on 
California  from  an attack  on  Sweden  (Sweden  is  not  and  has  never  been  a  member of 
NATO).  Sa the aim  is  ta communicate to  your adversary that the  territory  is  outside his 
direct sphere of influence, which, for example, Czechoslovakia is,  in  relation to the Soviet 
bloc.  This was not an easy task; one must not forget the Warsaw Pact, which was the Soviet 
equivalent to NATO.  The NATO allies had to rnake sure that Czechoslovakia was moving 
gradually further  and  further  away  from  the  Soviet  power.  "If we  make  it  clear that we 
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believe they (Soviets) are obliged to react to an intrusion in  Hungary as though we  were in 
the streets of Moscow, then they are obliged.,,157  Thus, the NATO allies during the events 
described  ear/ier were very carefu 1 not  to  show interest as to  what was  happening,  even 
, 
though this posturing was not very credible.  It was c1ear that the West was very interested in 
the separation of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact. 
Schelling's  surprise at the  events can also be  explained by the  fact  that since the  NATO 
powers had not shown interest in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets would not react in a forcefu 1 
manner.  The Soviet bloc, had always been seen as exactly that. .. a bloc, a very unified unit, 
"( ..  ), the communist part having cohesion that the rest of the world cou Id  hardi)' aspire to, a 
suffocating  ideology that would  suppress and eliminate not  only  dissent  but  national  and 
cultural  unity,  ( .. ),,158.  This can also be seen as  being heavily influenced by the Truman 
doctrine, which states that the wor/d are separated in two sides, one communist the other not. 
lt  \Vas  also  believed  that  the  communists  were  willing  to  risk  military  intervention  to 
increase their sphere of influence.  The events  in  Czechoslovakia directly contradicted the 
Truman doctrine;  it also showed that 20  years of a  repressive regime could not suppress a 
distinct  national  identity.  This is  wh)'  Schelling and  many  others thought that a  form  of 
revolution \Vas  possible 
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6.2  Schelling's conference in September 1968 
His  September 21 st  talk  was given  the title "The Uses  of Force  in  the  Nuclear Age";  it 
focused  especially  on the book  he  had written 2  years earlier at the  Institute,  Arms and 
Influence. 
Though  it  does  not  disavow  what  he  wrote  in  1966  (Arms  and Influence),  he  modifies 
several of his ideas and adds others.  It is  one of the first times when he  publicly criticizes 
the US government's decisions in Vietnam.  Aiso, he analyzes events that do not reinforce 
the theory he helped create.  The following is an analysis of the talk. 
What Schelling would have liked ta change or add to his Arms and Influence is  threcfold.  It 
is  important to  realize that he does not disavow what he  wrote and also, it  is  important to 
note the  difference  between  Schelling and  Ellsberg.  Schelling simply wishes  "to take it 
(Arms  and Influence) as a  point  of departure, amending it  v,,'here  1 think 1 was wrang and 
bringing it  up to the year 1968.,,159  The precision Schelling wanted to  bring concemed the 
use of weapons in Arms and Influence,  "Forcibly a country can repel, expel, penetrate and 
occupy, seize, exterminate, disarrn and disable, confine, deny access, and directly frustrate 
intrusion or attack.,,160  Schelling had meant tlUs  enumeration to be very incomplete.  Many 
had taken Schelling literally and had  not seen the list as being inadequate, but in  the  1968 
talk he says that what he really meant by the list was that, "You  can't make people do things 
with  military  force,,161.  This  precision  can  also  be  direct)y  linked  to  what  happened  in 
Prague since the 20 yeaTS  of military occupation imposed by the communist regime had not 
changed  the populations mind about libertyl62.  As Schelling says, "The cannon of a  tank 
cannat make a  ma..'1  express enthusiasm (. ),  or maké a man vote ( .).  Ali  it can do  is  kill 
,,163 h·  lm. 
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the Czechs wanted was larger individual liberty 
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What Schelling would have liked to add to his book relates to the use of military force.  The 
use of this force is  supposed to  make people resolve situations, rather than kill  them.  One 
will better understand why this is a very big change in  Schelling's thought, when looking at 
another addition Schelling would have Iiked to make to his  1966 book.  Schelling says, and 
this  is  a  departure  from  his  previous  line  of thought,  that a  govemment  is  not  like  an 
individual  it  does  not  act  or  change  its  mind  Iike  people,  "Governments  indeed  are 
composed of people, but the composition is  not equivalent to one large-sized individual who 
perceives,  cogitates and  decides ,,164  Schelling  did  have a  paragraph that stated essentially 
the sarne thing in Arms and Influence,  but it was on1y  a paragraph and it  did not have much 
impact on the reader as Schelling says "()  quite insufficient to cleansc my book of the sin 
of personification.,,165  It was not enough to make it clear to the reader that he did not see a 
foreign  govemment as  a  person:  a  lot  of what Schelling wrote during the  previous years 
made references to personificatlOn. 
It also  makes  a  reader ask  himself what the impacts of this  depersonalization on  conflict 
theory are.  It  also  raises  sorne  concems such as:  if one cannot interpret govemments as 
people (and rightly so, some might say), influencing and predicting its  actions become very 
complicated.  This precision seems to have been added by Schelling after spending time in 
govemment and getting to know its inner decision taking process.  (Thus, Schelling is guilty 
ofthe personification sin, but tries to repent himself.) 
This  line  of thought brings Schelling to ask himself, "How does a  government change its 
mind?"I66  His answer is  that a government changes its  mind  by changing its  complexion. 
For  example,  in  a  democracy  it  is  through  elections  that  a  government  changes  its 
complexion.  The problem with this, according to Schelling, is that in  the US., for example, 
this only happens every four years.  The direct consequence of this slow reaction time is that 
a bad decision can affect the political life of a country for 4 years before it can be changed. 
A striking example ofthis is the bombing of Hanoi during the Vietnam War.  This bombing 
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campaign was called Rolling Thunder and has been directly Iinked to Schelling and conflict 
theoryl67  [t  was  a  classic  example  of the  "no-cities"  strategy  that  was  advocated  by 
Schelling,  since  it  created  what was  called  the "Hanoi doughnut".  The bombing was  so 
intense that  it  destroyed practically everything around Hanoi;  it  also destroyed what little 
production capacity North Korea had.  The country had to import nearly everything it needed 
during the conflict from the Soviets and the Chinese. The aim ofthat bombing campaign was 
to "(.) raise the costs of the war to the North Vietnamese ( .. )"168,  to  raise it high enough 
that the North  Vietnamese would not want to  pursue the war against the U.S.  Then again 
Schelling asks  the  question "Which North Vietnamese, the ones who feel  the  pain,  or the 
ones who  make the decision?,,169 This is  one the reasons that can explain the failure of that 
particular  bombing  campaign.  It  is  not  sufficient that  sorne  North  Vietnamese  feel  the 
pressure;  the  decision  makers  themselves  have  to  see  the  price  of continuing  to  fight 
mcrease. 
Another point Schelling would have liked to change, had he \vritten Arms and Influence two 
years later, was rus  notion of deterrence.  It is  a concept that Schelling worked on for many 
years and  it  is at the center of many of the  notions  that he  developed  in  The  Strategy of 
Conflict and other articles that he wrote in  the first  half of the  1960's.  He now wished to 
modify the deterrence concept to include the possibility to be so deterred that the thought of 
taking action against an adversary would not even cross the  minds of the decision-makers. 
As  Schelling puts it "(  ... ) so thoroughly deterred that no-one even expected us  to intervene, 
with the result that the high cost of disappointing those expectations could not confront us as 
a counter deterrent. ,,170  In  an effort ta illustrate trus,  Schelling also gives an example; the 
NATü member nations were sa thoroughly deterred from taking action against the  Soviet 
Union  in  Czechoslovakia  that  they  did  not  even  attempt  to  show  that  the)'  found 
Czechoslovakia so important as ta intervene if the Soviet Union chose ta do sa.  There was 
no  reaction ta the  Soviet intervention by  the  US. govemment other than  what then  vice­
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president Nixon said about the fact that the US. embargo that was already in  place against 
the Soviet Union should continue. 
Schelling wanted to take the concept of deterrence even further than before, as far as to say 
that when deterrence works to its fullest, the thought of taking action should not even cross 
one's mind.  One can also help deter oneself, by never committing oneself, as was the case 
in Czechoslovakia; the U.S. never committed itselfto intervention. 
Finally, the third point Schelling would have liked to add to rus  1966  publication was the 
high cost on national unity that the use of violence can have, "(  ... ) if the actual course of  the 
war had been seen as a likely one, the priee would have been judged too high. ·,171  Schelling 
had  nev~r  mentioned  how the population could react to the  decisions  a  government took 
during a confliet.  Now, seeing how much civil unrest the Vietnam War caused in  the US., 
he had to.  And  his  conclusion was that national  unity was more important then  whatever 
could be gained by winning the Vietnam conflict. 
As  for  Ellsberg,  his  dissatisfactions  with the  US govemmenfs actions  motivated  him  to 
publish a series ofpapers that argued against what the U.S was doing in Vietnam. 
6.3  Ellsberg's Lessons of Vietnam 
In  June of 1969,  Ellsberg published for the members of the RAND  Corporation a series of 
papers under the working title of "Lessons of Vietnam". These papers are very incomplete 
and unpolished but he  published them, "in the  interest of communication, stimulation, (. .. ) 
feedback ofthoughts and reaction to  me.,,172  The primary source for these papers where the 
notes  that  Ellsberg  had  colleeted  during the  preceding  years,  especially  while  he  was  in 
Vietnam.  He was also, at the time, unknown to anyone, photocopying the Pentagon Papers 
at night. 
171  Schelling (1968). p.  12 
172 Ellsberg (1969a). p.  ii 72 
Ellsberg  does  not  completely  disavow the  influence  of conflict theory  on  U.S.  Vietnam 
operations.  When  asked  if the  limited  war doctrine  was  to  be  held  responsible  for  the 
increasingly  large-scale  intervention  in  Vietnam,  Ellsberg  answered  to  the  contrary.  He 
thought  that  it  was  the  over-confidence on the  part of the  U.S.  in  strategie  bombing that 
could be, at least partially, blamed for the large-scale intervention. 
"( ... ) a widespread belief in the efficacy and acceptability of  aerial bombing, and in 
particular of bombing of a strategie nature, aimed at the will of the opponents (... ) 
This belief played a critical, if not decisive, role in  getting us into Vietnam, (.)  and 
then in stimulating escalation while keeping us ïeassured as to ultimate success"173 
Keep  in  mind  that operation  Rolling  Thunder  was  heavily  influenced  by  conflict theory, 
since its aim was to cause an increasingly high cost of pursuing the war and thus force the 
enemy to lay  his  weapons  down.  Ellsberg,  like  Schelling,  also stresses that  this  kind of 
operation, should not last very long "(..) any bombing we may do need not last very long 
and  the resulting damage will not be pennanent,,174, the reason being that the result of long 
term  bombing  causes  irrevocable damage;  one  does  not  want to  fight  an enemy that has 
nothing to lose.  Obviously,  this  part of \-"hat  conflict them·y  preached  was  not  observed 
Another probJem was the difficulty of communicating with the Viet Cong and the fact that 
their utility function did not appear ta be what the Pentagon bureaucrats perceived it to be. 
They should have given a  lot  more importance to resisting enemy forces.  Jt  must not be 
forgotten  that the  Vietnamese  had  resisted  invasion  for  over 400  years  and  had  recently 
defeated the French. 
Yet another example of the fact that Ellsberg had not completeJy lost faith in  what conflict 
theory had to offer in  the analysis of conflict situations, ,;vas that he  never ceased seeing the 
Vietnam  conflict as  a  negotiation.  In "US Aims  and  Leverage  in  Vietnam,  1950-65", 
published in the "Lessons of Vietnam"  series,  Ellsberg diseuses what the  U.S.  government 
did and could have done in the hope of  winning the Vietnam war  In part, Ellsberg sees this 
failure as the  result of bad strategy on  the  part of the  V.S.  govemment.  For example,  in 
instances  where  the  wrong  message  was  being  communicated;  "Jt  is  their  (South 
173 Ellsberg (1 969b), p. 
174  fbid,  p.  3 73 
Vietnamese) fight,  and they have to  win it"l75,  when it  should have been . "In view of our 
national interest, it is  our fight, but they have got to win it for us; because if they don't, we 
might have tO.,,176  The government was sending the message that it did not value Vietnam as 
much as, say, Califomia, to  use Schelling's example.  It  was sending the signal, that it  did 
not  value  Vietnam  and,  was  perhaps  not  ready  to  fight  as  hard  as  it  should  to  save  it. 
Another example, is how Ellsberg characterizes the U.S. government's leaming function (in 
fact  he  says  that  it  does  not  leam,  or  not  fast  enough,  this  being  another  example  of 
personification), "(... ) we are very unlikely to leam fast enough, we must conclude time is 
strongly  against  us;  and  our  attitudes  in  negotiation  should  reflect  this  conc!usion,,177 
Finally,  another example is  that Ellsberg thinks that the  Viet-Cong has  understood how to 
exploit U.S. vveaknesses, "The longer we allow the fighting to go on, the more difficulty we 
will  have,  because the VC  have gotten our number (... ),,178  and that "(... ),  our bargaining 
position is likely to get worse over time, not better.,,179 
175 Ellsberg (1969a), p.  2 (parenthesis mine) 
176Ibid, p. 2 
177 Ellsberg (l969b), p.  13 
178  Ibid, p.  14 
179 Ibid,p.14 CONCLUSION 
It  was  Schelling  and  Ellsberg's  dissatisfaction  with  the  theory  of games  as  weil  as  the 
context of the  late  1950's and  1960's that motivated them  to  work on a  special branch of 
decision theory  l80.  They created what is now known as the Theory of Conflict, a theory that 
uses non-zero sum games to find a winning behavior in conflicts.  It  was also this  context 
which  contributed  to  their  subsequent  break  with  the  miiitarv  and  the  political 
establishments.  One  also  hopes  to  have  shown  what  Schelling  and  El1sberg  wished  to 
accomplish with this theory, which was to bring a conflict to a satisfactory end. 
Though  one  has  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  language  nuclear-deterrence  and  thus  conflict 
theory uses is  one that is very demanding (counterforce, no-cities, first-strike capacity ... ),  it 
is a vocabulary that often tends to scare the general public off, and thus the people that are 
familiar with it (the insiders) can use it to their advantage.  The vocabulary can make people 
believe that the  risks  of general war,  or violence  for  that  matter,  are  under control.  The 
language can desensitize people towards reality.  We are actual1y talking about using human 
creations, to threaten, control and ultimately kill other human beings.  Schelling and Ellsberg 
realized this in the early 1970's when they decided to  sever their ties  with the government 
and the other insiders. 
The release of the Pentagon Papers prompted the US  govenunent to sue Ellsberg on treason 
charges, which  were eventually dropped.  As for Schel1ing,  when  he  tried (with the other 
Harvard professors), as was said earlier, to meet with Kissinger in  1970, the latter refused to 
meet with them, and told them that time would show that the president's (Nixon) decision 
was the right one.  In the article reproduced on Appendix A, Schelling told journalists that 
the decision to send Arnerican troops into Cambodia was "(... ) inexcusably alld unjustifiably 
wrong" and that it  left him (speaking for the group) "scared about the next decision".  He 
finally added that "(... ) several of us  said .ve are now 50 absolutely dismayed that we are 
180 Even though further work is needed in numerous parts of the project, especially Ellsberg's 
treatrnent of threats in his Lowell Lectures. 75 
through collaborating with the executive branch".  One can easily understand why Schelling 
reacted  in  such a  way  since Cambodia was  a threshold Schelling did not want the  U. S.  to 
pass.  It was something that resembJed the Yalu River in the Korean confliet and could have 
provoked another nation to join the Viet Cong in their combat against the U.S. 
The break also forced Schelling to change the focus of his research, and in  the early  1970's 
he started working on urban development models, fonnalizing why urban developments are 
relatively  homogenous.  Ellsberg on  the other hand  left the  economic research sphere and 
focused his attention on anti-war lobbying.  It is strange to see the parallel between Elisberg 
and  Albert  Einstein whose discovery  made  the  atomic  bomb  possible and  who  spent the 
latter part of his  Iife as  an anti-war activist detached from  physics.  They  both worked on 
military issues (Einstein not directly but his discovery did lead to the creation of the  most 
powerful  weapon humanity has  ever knov,rn)  and they both became disillusioned with that 
world.  They,  however,  used the influence they had  eamed with the  military and  strategie 
spheres for anti-war protests. 
It  was  Schelling  who  decided  to  name  this  special  branch  of economics  the  Theory  of 
Conflict. A number of concepts developed by Schelling, Ellsberg and others that worked on 
conflict  theory  at  one  time  or  another  are  still  influencing  game  theory  and  economic 
analysis.  Specifically, Schelling's ideas for the resolution of non-zero sum games have had 
a lasting influence. 
Conflict theory has had  influence on military affairs as  weIl  as on the strategie aspect of il. 
The  Vietnam  campaign  was  influenced  by  conflict  theory,  though  Schelling  or  Ellsberg 
cannot be blamed for the way it tumed out; Schelling 'vvanted  it to be a very short campaign, 
three  weeks  maximum  Though  it  could  be  said  to  Schelling's and  especially  Ellsberg's 
benefit  that their actions towards the  end of the  1960's and early the  1970's helped put an 
end  to  the  confliet,  the  biggest impact probably come from  the  reaction of the  American 
public.  The Cold War was also influenced by conflict theory; its  influence was probably a 
positive one,  as  there has  not been a  Third World War, even  if it  did  nothing to  appease 
spirits at that time. 76 
It is  amazing to  see how concepts that were developed more than 40 years ago are still of 
importance to this day, even though Schelling admits in  the preface of the  1980 edition of 
The  Sfrafegy of  Conjlicf, that he  hoped for  more by publishing the book; "In putting these 
essays together to make the book, 1 hoped to help establish an interdisciplinary field (  .. ) 
The  field  that  1  hoped  would  become  established  has  continued  to  develop,  but  not 
.  1  (  ),,181 1  ... exp oSlve y, 
In  2005,  Thomas  Schelling  (with  Robert  Aumann)  was  awarded  the  Nobel  Prize  in 
economics  for  offering  "(..)  new  insights  into  the  dynamics  aspects  of conflict  and 
cooperation.  Thomas Schelling showed us  how one party in a conflict can often strengthens 
its position by overtly worsening or limiting its own options (. .. ),,182 
181  Schelling (1980), p.  vi 
182 Presentation of the Nobel prize to Schelling ApPENDIXA 
Schelling breaks with the Nixon administration on the Vietnam War policy. 
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